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Signal Detection With Criterion Noise: Applications
to Recognition Memory
Aaron S. Benjamin, Michael Diaz, and Serena Wee
University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign
A tacit but fundamental assumption of the theory of signal detection is that criterion placement is a
noise-free process. This article challenges that assumption on theoretical and empirical grounds and
presents the noisy decision theory of signal detection (ND-TSD). Generalized equations for the isosen-
sitivity function and for measures of discrimination incorporating criterion variability are derived, and the
model’s relationship with extant models of decision making in discrimination tasks is examined. An
experiment evaluating recognition memory for ensembles of word stimuli revealed that criterion noise is
not trivial in magnitude and contributes substantially to variance in the slope of the isosensitivity
function. The authors discuss how ND-TSD can help explain a number of current and historical puzzles
in recognition memory, including the inconsistent relationship between manipulations of learning and the
isosensitivity function’s slope, the lack of invariance of the slope with manipulations of bias or payoffs,
the effects of aging on the decision-making process in recognition, and the nature of responding in
remember–know decision tasks. ND-TSD poses novel, theoretically meaningful constraints on theories
of recognition and decision making more generally, and provides a mechanism for rapprochement
between theories of decision making that employ deterministic response rules and those that postulate
probabilistic response rules.
Keywords: signal detection, recognition memory, criteria, decision making
The theory of signal detection (TSD1; Green & Swets, 1966;
Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; Peterson, Birdsall, & Fox, 1954;
Tanner & Swets, 1954) is a theory of decision making that has
been widely applied to psychological tasks involving detection,
discrimination, identification, and choice, as well as to problems in
engineering and control systems. Its historical development fol-
lows quite naturally from earlier theories in psychophysics (Black-
well, 1953; Fechner, 1860; Thurstone, 1927) and advances in
statistics (Wald, 1950). The general framework has proven suffi-
ciently flexible so as to allow substantive cross-fertilization with
related areas in statistics and psychology, including mixture dis-
tributions (DeCarlo, 2002), theories of information integration in
multidimensional spaces (Banks, 2000; Townsend & Ashby,
1982), models of group decision making (Sorkin & Dai, 1994),
models of response timing (D. A. Norman & Wickelgren, 1969;
Sekuler, 1965; Thomas & Myers, 1972), and multiprocess models
that combine thresholded and continuous evidence distributions
(Yonelinas, 1999). It also exhibits well-characterized relationships
with other prominent perspectives, such as individual choice the-
ory (Luce, 1959) and threshold-based models (Krantz, 1969;
Swets, 1986b). Indeed, it is arguably the most widely used and
successful theoretical framework in psychology of the past half
century.
The theoretical underpinnings of TSD can be summarized in
four basic postulates:
1. Events are individual enumerable trials on which a signal
is present or not.
2. A strength value characterizes the evidence for the pres-
ence of the signal on a given trial.
3. Random variables characterize the conditional probabil-
ity distributions of strength values for signal-present and
signal-absent events (for detection) or for Signal A and
Signal B events (for discrimination).
4. A criterion serves to map the continuous strength vari-
able (or its associated likelihood ratio) onto a binary (or
n-ary) decision variable.
As applied to recognition memory experiments (Banks, 1970;
Egan, 1958; Lockhart & Murdock, 1970; Parks, 1966), in which
subjects make individual judgments about whether a test item was
1 More commonly, this theory is referred to as signal-detection theory
(e.g., Swets, 1964). Here, the alternative acronym TSD is preferred (see
also Birdsall, 1966; Lockhart & Murdock, 1970; Tanner, 1960) in that it
properly emphasizes the theory’s relation to, but not isomorphism with,
statistical decision theory (Wald, 1950).
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previously viewed in a particular delimited study episode, the
signal is considered to be the prior study of the item. That study
event is thought to confer additional strength on the item such that
studied items generally, but not always, yield greater evidence for
prior study than do unstudied items. Subjects then make a decision
about whether they did or did not study the item by comparing the
strength yielded by the current test stimulus to a decision criterion.
Analytically, TSD reparameterizes the obtained experimental sta-
tistics as estimates of discriminability and response criterion or
bias. Theoretical conclusions about the mnemonic aspects of rec-
ognition performance are often drawn from the form of the iso-
sensitivity function,2 which is a plot of the theoretical hit rate
against the theoretical false-alarm rate across all possible criterion
values. The function is typically estimated from points derived
from a confidence-rating procedure (Egan, 1958; Egan, Schulman,
& Greenberg, 1959).
TSD has been successfully applied to recognition because it
provides an articulated and intuitive description of the decision
portion of the task without obliging any particular theoretical
account of the relevant memory processes. In fact, theoretical
interpretations derived from the application of TSD to recognition
memory have been cited as major constraints on process models of
recognition (e.g., McClelland & Chappell, 1998; Shiffrin &
Steyvers, 1997). Recent evidence reveals an increased role of TSD
in research on recognition memory: The number of citations in
PsycINFO that appear in response to a joint query of recognition
memory and signal detection as keywords has increased from 23 in
the 1980s to 39 in the 1990s to 67 in just the first seven years of
this decade.
The purpose of this article is to theoretically and empirically
evaluate the postulate of a noise-free criterion (Assumption 4,
above) and to describe an extension of TSD that is sufficiently
flexible to handle criterion variability. The claim is that criteria
may vary from trial to trial in part because of noise inherent in the
processes involved with maintaining and updating them. Although
this claim does not seriously violate the theoretical structure of
TSD, it does have major implications for how we draw theoretical
conclusions about memory, perception, and decision processes
from detection, discrimination, and recognition experiments.
As we review below, concerns about variability in the decision
process are apparent in a variety of literatures, and theoretical tools
have been advanced to address the problems that arise from noisy
decision making (Rosner & Kochaniski, 2008). However, theoriz-
ing in recognition memory has mostly advanced independently of
such concerns, perhaps in part because of the difficulty associated
with disentangling decision noise from representational noise (see,
e.g., Ratcliff & Starns, in press). This article considers the statis-
tical and analytic problems that arise from its postulation in the
context of detection theoretical models and applies a novel exper-
imental task—the ensemble recognition paradigm—toward the
problem of estimating criterion variance.
Historical Antecedents and Contemporary Motivation
Considerations similar to the ones forwarded here have been
previously raised in the domains of psychoacoustics and psycho-
physics (Durlach & Braida, 1969; Gravetter & Lockhead, 1973)
but have not been broadly considered in the domain of recognition
memory. An exception is the seminal “strength theory” of Wick-
elgren (1968; Wickelgren & Norman, 1966; D. A. Norman &
Wickelgren, 1969), on whose work our initial theoretical rationale
is based. That work was applied predominately to problems in
short-term memory and to the question of how absolute (yes–no)
and relative (forced-choice) response tasks differ from one an-
other. However, general analytic forms for the computation of
detection statistics were not provided, nor was the work applied to
the relationship between the isosensitivity function and theories of
recognition memory (which were not prominent at the time).
Contemporary versions of the TSD are best understood by their
relation to the general class of judgment models derived from
Thurstone (1927). A taxonomy of those models described by
Torgerson (1958) allows various restrictions on the equality of
stimulus variance and of criterial variance; current applications of
TSD to recognition memory vary in whether they permit stimulus
variance to differ across distributions, but they almost unilaterally
disallow criterial variance. This is a restriction that, although not
unique to this field, is certainly a surprising dissimilarity with work
in related areas such as detection and discrimination in psycho-
physical tasks (Bonnel & Miller, 1994; Durlach & Braida, 1969;
Nosofsky, 1983) and classification (Ashby & Maddox, 1993; Erev,
1998; Kornbrot, 1980). The extension of TSD to the noisy decision
theory of signal detection (ND-TSD) is a relaxation of this restric-
tion: ND-TSD permits nonzero criterial variance.
The recent explosion of work evaluating the exact form of the
isosensitivity function in recognition memory under different con-
ditions (Arndt & Reder, 2002; Glanzer, Kim, Hilford, & Adams,
1999; Gronlund & Elam, 1994; Kelley & Wixted, 2001; Matzen &
Benjamin, in press; Qin, Raye, Johnson, & Mitchell, 2001; Rat-
cliff, McKoon, & Tindall, 1994; Ratcliff, Sheu, & Gronlund, 1992;
Slotnick, Klein, Dodson, & Shimamura, 2000; Van Zandt, 2000;
Yonelinas, 1994, 1997, 1999) and in different populations (M. R.
Healy, Light, & Chung, 2005; Howard, Bessette-Symons, Zhang,
& Hoyer, 2006; Manns, Hopkins, Reed, Kitchener, & Squire,
2003; Wixted & Squire, 2004a, 2004b; Yonelinas, Kroll, Dobbins,
Lazzara, & Knight, 1998; Yonelinas et al., 2002, 2004), as well as
the prominent role those functions play in current theoretical
development (Dennis & Humphreys, 2001; Glanzer, Adams, Iver-
son, & Kim, 1993; McClelland & Chappell, 1998; Shiffrin &
Steyvers, 1997; Wixted, 2007; Yonelinas, 1999), suggests the need
for a thorough reappraisal of the underlying variables that contrib-
ute to those functions. Because work in psychophysics (Krantz,
1969; Nachmias & Steinman, 1963) and, more recently, in recog-
nition memory (Malmberg, 2002; Malmberg & Xu, 2006; Wixted
& Stretch, 2004) has illustrated how aspects and suboptimalities of
the decision process can influence the shape of the isosensitivity
function, the goals of this article are to provide an organizing
framework for the incorporation of decision noise within TSD and
to help expand the various theoretical discussions within the field
of recognition memory to include a role for decision variability.
2 Following the suggestion of Luce (1963), we use the term isosensitivity
function instead of the more historically relevant but somewhat unintuitive
label of receiver (or relative) operating characteristic (ROC). Throughout
this article, no change in terminology is used to indicate whether the
isosensitivity function is plotted in probability or normal-deviate coordi-
nates, other than to the relevant axes in figures, unless the distinction is
relevant to that discussion.
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We suggest that drawing conclusions about the theoretical com-
ponents of recognition memory from the form of the isosensitivity
function can be a dangerous enterprise and show how a number of
historical and current puzzles in the literature may benefit from a
consideration of criterion noise.
Organization of the Article
The first part of this article provides a short background on the
assumptions of traditional TSD models, as well as evidence bear-
ing on the validity of those assumptions. Appreciating the nature of
the arguments underlying the currently influential unequal-
variance version of TSD is critical to understanding the principle
of criterial variance and the proposed analytic procedure for sep-
arately estimating criterial and evidence variance. In the second
part of the article, we critically evaluate the assertion of a station-
ary and nonvariable scalar criterion value3 from a theoretical and
empirical perspective, and in the third section, we provide basic
derivations for the form of the isosensitivity function in the pres-
ence of nonzero criterial variability. The fourth portion of the
article provides derivations for measures of accuracy in the pres-
ence of criterial noise and leads to the presentation, in the fifth
section, of the ensemble recognition task, which can be used to
assess criterial noise. In the sixth part of the article, different
models of that experimental task are considered and evaluated, and
estimates of criterial variability are provided. In the seventh and
final part of the article, we review the implications of the findings
and some of the situations in which a consideration of criterial
variability might advance our progress on a number of interesting
problems in recognition memory and beyond.
It is important to note that the successes of TSD have led to
many unanswered questions and that a reconsideration of basic
principles like criterion invariance may provide insight into those
problems. No less an authority than John Swets—the researcher
most responsible for introducing TSD to psychology—noted that it
was unclear why, for example, the slope of the isosensitivity line
for detection of brain tumors was approximately half the slope of
the isosensitivity line for detection of abnormal tissue cells (Swets,
1986a). Within the field of recognition memory, there is evidence
that certain manipulations that lead to increased accuracy, such as
increased study time, are also associated with decreased slope of
the isosensitivity function (Glanzer et al., 1999; Hirshman &
Hostetter, 2000), whereas other manipulations that also lead to
superior performance are not (Ratcliff et al., 1994). Although there
are extant theories that account for changes in slope, there is no
agreed-upon mechanism by which they do so, nor is an explanation
of such heterogeneous effects forthcoming.
Throughout this article, we make reference to the recognition
decision problem, but most of the considerations presented here
are relevant to other problems in detection and discrimination, and
we hope that the superficial application to recognition memory
will not deter from the more general message about the need to
consider decision-based noise in such problems (see also Durlach
& Braida, 1969; Gravetter & Lockhead, 1973; Nosofsky, 1983;
Wickelgren, 1968).
Assumptions About Evidence Distributions
The lynchpin theoretical apparatus of TSD is the probabilistic
relationship between signal status and perceived evidence. The
historical assumption about this relationship is that the distribu-
tions of the random variables are normal in form (Thurstone, 1927)
and of equal variance, separated by some distance, d (Green &
Swets, 1966). Whereas the former assumption has survived in-
quiry, the latter has been less successful.
The original (Peterson et al., 1954) and most popularly applied
version of TSD assumes that signal and noise distributions are of
equal variance. Although many memory researchers tacitly en-
dorse this assumption by reporting summary measures of discrim-
ination and criterion placement that derive from the application of
the equal-variance model, such as d and Cj, respectively, the
empirical evidence does not support the equal-variance assump-
tion. The slope of the isosensitivity function in recognition mem-
ory is often found to be 0.80 (Ratcliff et al., 1992), although this
value may change with increasing discriminability (Glanzer et al.,
1999; Heathcote, 2003; Hirshman & Hostetter, 2000). This result
has been taken to imply that the evidence distribution for studied
items is of greater variance than the distribution for unstudied
items (Green & Swets, 1966). The magnitude of this effect, not its
existence, and whether manipulations that enhance or attenuate it
are actually affecting representational variance, are the issues at
stake here.
The remarkable linearity of the isosensitivity function notwith-
standing, it is critical for present purposes to note not only that the
mean slope for recognition memory is often less than 1 but also
that it varies considerably over situations and individuals (Green &
Swets, 1966). It is considerably lower than 0.8 for some tasks (e.g.,
0.6 for the detection of brain tumors; Swets et al., 1979), higher
than 1 for other tasks (e.g., information retrieval; Swets, 1969), and
around 1.0 for yet others (e.g., odor recognition; Rabin & Cain,
1984).
Nonunit and variable slopes reveal an inadequacy of the equal-
variance model of Peterson et al. (1954) and of the validity of the
measure d. This failure can be addressed in several ways. It might
be assumed that the distributions of evidence are asymmetric in
form, for example, or that one or the other distribution reflects a
mixture of latent distributions (DeCarlo, 2002; Yonelinas, 1994).
The traditional and still predominant explanation, however, is the
one described above—that the variance of the distributions is
unequal (Green & Swets, 1966; Wixted, 2007). Because the slope
of the isosensitivity function is equal to the ratio of the standard
deviations of the noise and signal distributions in the unequal-
variance TSD model, the empirical estimates of slope less than 1
have promoted the inference that the signal distribution is of
greater variance than the noise distribution in recognition. How-
ever, the statistical theory of the form of the isosensitivity function
that is used to understand nonunit slopes and slope variability has
been only partially unified with the psychological theories that
produce such behavior, via either the interactivity of continuous
and thresholding mechanisms (Yonelinas, 1999) or the averaging
3 Criterion is used throughout to refer to the location of a decision
threshold in the units of the evidence dimension (i.e., in terms of the values
on the abscissa in Figure 1, which are typically standard deviations of the
noise distribution). Bias—a term sometimes used interchangeably with
criterion—refers specifically to the value of the likelihood ratio at criterion.
In the discussion here, the distinction is often not relevant, in which case
we use the term criterion.
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process presumed by global matching mechanisms (Gillund &
Shiffrin, 1984; Hintzman, 1986; Humphreys, Pike, Bain, & Tehan,
1989; Murdock, 1982). None of these prominent theories include
a role for criterial variability, nor do they provide a comprehensive
account of the shape of isosensitivity functions and of the effect of
manipulations on that shape. Criterial variability can directly affect
the slope of the isosensitivity function, a datum that opens up novel
theoretical possibilities for psychological models of behavior un-
derlying the isosensitivity function.
The form of the isosensitivity function has been used to test the
validity of assumptions built into TSD about the nature of the
evidence distributions, as well as to estimate parameters for those
distributions. In that sense, TSD can be said to have bootstrapped
itself into its current position of high esteem: Its validity has
mostly been established by confirming its implications, rather than
by systematically testing its individual assumptions. This is not
intended to be a point of criticism, but it must be kept in mind that
the accuracy of such estimation and testing depends fundamentally
on the joint assumptions that evidence is inherently variable and
that criterion location is not. Allowing criterial noise to play a role
raises the possibility that previous explorations of the isosensitivity
function in recognition memory have conflated the contributions
of stimulus and criterial noise.
Evidence for Criterion Variability
As noted earlier, traditional TSD assumes that criterion place-
ment is a noise-free and stationary process. Although there is some
acknowledgment of the processes underlying criterion inconsis-
tency (see, e.g., Macmillan & Creelman, 2005, p. 46), the appa-
ratus of criterion placement in TSD stands in stark contrast to the
central assumption of stimulus-related variability (see also Rosner
& Kochanski, 2008). There are numerous reasons to doubt the
validity of the idea that criteria are noise free. First, there is
evidence from detection and discrimination tasks of response
autocorrelations, as well as systematic effects of experimental
manipulations on response criteria. Second, maintaining the values
of one or multiple criteria poses a memory burden and should thus
be subject to forgetting and memory distortion. Third, comprehen-
sive models of response time and accuracy in choice tasks suggest
the need for criterial variability. Fourth, there is evidence from
basic and well-controlled psychophysical tasks of considerable
trial-to-trial variability in the placement of criteria. Fifth, there are
small but apparent differences between forced-choice response
tasks and yes–no response tasks that indicate a violation of one of
the most fundamental relationships predicted by TSD: the equality
of the area under the isosensitivity function as estimated by the
rating procedure and the proportion of correct responses in a
two-alternative forced-choice task. This section reviews each of
these arguments more fully.
In each case, it is important to distinguish between systematic
and nonsystematic sources of variability in criterion placement.
This distinction is critical because only nonsystematic variability
violates the actual underlying principle of a nonvariable criterion.
Some scenarios violate the usual use, but not the underlying
principles, of TSD. This section identifies some sources of sys-
tematic variability and outlines the theoretical mechanisms that
have been invoked to handle them. We also review evidence for
nonsystematic sources of variability. Systematic sources of vari-
ability can be modeled within TSD by allowing criterion measures
to vary with experimental manipulations (Benjamin, 2001; Ben-
jamin & Bawa, 2004; S. Brown & Steyvers, 2005; S. Brown,
Steyvers, & Hemmer, 2007), by postulating a time-series criterion
localization process contingent upon feedback (Atkinson, Carter-
ette, & Kinchla, 1964; Atkinson & Kinchla, 1965; Friedman,
Carterette, Nakatani, & Ahumada, 1968) only following errors
(Kac, 1962; Thomas, 1973) or only following correct responses
(Model 3 of Dorfman & Biderman, 1971), or as a combination of
a long-term learning process and nonrandom momentary fluctua-
tions (Treisman, 1987; Treisman & Williams, 1984). Criterial
variance can even be modeled with a probabilistic responding
mechanism (Parks, 1966; Thomas, 1975; White & Wixted, 1999),
although the inclusion of such a mechanism violates much of the
spirit of TSD.
Nonstationarity
When data are averaged across trials to compute TSD parame-
ters, the researcher is tacitly assuming that the criterion is invariant
across those trials. By extension, when parameters are computed
across an entire experiment, measures of discriminability and
criterion are only valid when the criterion is stationary over that
entire period. Unfortunately, there is a abundance of evidence that
this condition is rarely, if ever, met.
Response autocorrelations. Research more than half a century
ago established the presence of longer runs of responses than
would be expected under a response-independence assumption
(Fernberger, 1920; Howarth & Bulmer, 1956; McGill, 1957; Ship-
ley, 1961; Verplanck, Collier, & Cotton, 1952; Verplanck, Cotton,
& Collier, 1953; Wertheimer, 1953). More recently, response
autocorrelations (Gilden & Wilson, 1995; Luce, Nosofsky, Green,
& Smith, 1982; Staddon, King, & Lockhead, 1980) and response
time autocorrelations (Gilden, 1997, 2001; Van Orden, Holden, &
Turvey, 2003) within choice tasks have been noted and evaluated
in terms of long-range fractal properties (Gilden, 2001; Thornton
& Gilden, in press) or short-range response dependencies (Wagen-
makers, Farrell, & Ratcliff, 2004, 2005). Such dependencies have
even been reported in the context of tasks eliciting confidence
ratings (Mueller & Weidemann, 2008). Numerous models were
proposed to account for short-range response dependencies, most
of which include a mechanism for the adjustment of the response
criterion on the basis of feedback of one sort or another (e.g., Kac,
1962; Thomas, 1973; Treisman, 1987; Treisman & Williams,
1984). Because criterion variance was presumed to be systemati-
cally related to aspects of the experiment and the subject’s perfor-
mance, however, statistical models that incorporate random crite-
rial noise were not applied to such tasks (e.g., Durlach & Braida,
1969; Gravetter & Lockhead, 1973; Wickelgren, 1968).
The presence of such response correlations in experiments in
which the signal value is uncorrelated across trials implies shifts in
the decision regime, either in terms of signal reception or trans-
duction or in terms of criterion location. To illustrate this distinc-
tion, consider a typical subject in a detection experiment whose
interest and attention fluctuate with surrounding conditions (did an
attractive research assistant just pass by the door?) and changing
internal states (increasing hunger or boredom). If these distractions
cause the subject to attend less faithfully to the experiment for a
period of time, it could lead to systematically biased evidence
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values and, thus, biased responses. Alternatively, if a subject’s
criterion fluctuates because such distraction affects the subject’s
ability to maintain a stable value, it will bias responses equiva-
lently from the decision-theoretic perspective. More importantly,
fluctuating criteria can lead to response autocorrelations even
when the transduction mechanism does not lead to correlated
evidence values. Teasing apart these two sources of variability is
the major empirical difficulty of our current enterprise.
Effects of experimental manipulations. Stronger evidence for
the lability of criteria comes from tasks in which experimental
manipulations are shown to induce strategic changes. Subjects
appear to modulate their criterion on the basis of their estimated
degree of learning (Hirshman, 1995) and perceived difficulty of
the distractor set in recognition (Benjamin & Bawa, 2004; S.
Brown et al., 2007). Subjects even appear to dynamically shift
criteria in response to item characteristics, such as idiosyncratic
familiarity (J. Brown, Lewis, & Monk, 1977) and word frequency
(Benjamin, 2003). In addition, criteria exhibit reliable individual
differences as a function of personality traits (Benjamin, Wee, &
Roberts, 2008), thus suggesting another unmodeled source of
variability in detection tasks.
It is important to note, however, that criterion changes do not
always appear when expected (e.g., Higham, Perfect, & Bruno, in
press; Stretch & Wixted, 1998; Verde & Rotello, 2007) and are
rarely of an optimal magnitude. It is for this reason that there is
some debate over whether subject-controlled criterion movement
underlies all of the effects that it has been invoked to explain
(Criss, 2006) and indeed, more generally, over whether a recon-
ceptualization of the decision variable itself provides a superior
explanation to that of strategic criterion setting (for a review in the
context of “mirror effects,” see Greene, 2007). For present pur-
poses, it is worth noting that this inconsistency may well reflect the
fact that criterion maintenance imposes a nontrivial burden on the
rememberer and that he or she may occasionally forgo strategic
shifting to minimize the costs of allocating the resources to do so.
These many contributors to criterion variability make it likely
that every memory experiment contains a certain amount of sys-
tematic but unattributed sources of variance that may affect inter-
pretations of the isosensitivity function if not explicitly modeled.
To be clear, such effects are the province of the current model only
if they are undetected and unincorporated into the application of
TSD to the data. The systematic variability evident in strategic
criterion movement may, depending on the nature of that variabil-
ity, meet the assumptions of ND-TSD and thus be accounted for
validly, but we explicitly deal with purely nonsystematic variabil-
ity in our statistical model.
The Memory Burden of Criterion Maintenance
Given the many systematic sources of variance in criterion
placement, it is unlikely that recapitulation of criterion location
from trial to trial is a trivial task for the subject. The current
criterion location is determined by some complex function relating
past experience, implicit and explicit payoffs, and experience thus
far in the test, and retrieval of the current value is likely prone to
error—a fact that may explain why intervening or unexpected
tasks or events that disrupt the normal pace or rhythm of the test
appear to affect criterion placement (Hockley & Niewiadomski,
2001). Evidence for this memory burden is apparent when com-
paring the form of isosensitivity functions estimated from rating
procedures with estimates from other procedures, such as payoff
manipulations.
Differences between rating-scale and payoff procedures. The
difficulty of criterion maintenance is exacerbated in experiments in
which confidence ratings are gathered because the subject is forced
to maintain multiple criteria, one for each confidence boundary.
Although it is unlikely that these values are maintained as inde-
pendent entities (Stretch & Wixted, 1998), the burden nonetheless
increases with the number of required confidence boundaries.
Variability introduced by the confidence-rating procedure may
explain why the isosensitivity function differs slightly when esti-
mated with that procedure as compared with experiments that
manipulate payoff matrices, as well as why rating-derived func-
tions change shape slightly but unexpectedly when the prior odds
of signal and noise are varied (Balakrishnan, 1998a; Markowitz &
Swets, 1967; Van Zandt, 2000). These findings have been taken to
indicate a fundamental failing of the basic assumptions of TSD
(Balakrishnan, 1998a, 1998b, 1999) but may simply reflect the
contribution of criterion noise (Mueller & Weidemann, 2008).
Deviations of the yes–no decision point on the isosensitivity
function. A related piece of evidence comes from the comparison
of isosensitivity functions from rating procedures with single
points derived from a yes–no judgment. As noted by Wickelgren
(1968), it is not uncommon for that yes–no point to lie slightly
above the isosensitivity function (Egan, Greenberg, & Schulman,
1961; Markowitz & Swets, 1967; Schulman & Mitchell, 1966;
Watson, Rilling, & Bourbon, 1964; Wickelgren & Norman, 1966)
and for that effect to be somewhat larger when more confidence
categories are employed. This result likely reflects the fact that the
maintenance of criteria becomes more difficult with increasing
numbers of criterion points. In recognition memory, Benjamin,
Lee, and Diaz (2008) showed that discrimination between previ-
ously studied and unstudied words was measured to be superior
when subjects made yes–no discrimination judgments than when
they used a 4-point response scale, as well as superior on the
4-point response scale when compared with an 8-point response
scale. This result is consistent with the idea that each criterion
introduces noise to the decision process and that, in the traditional
analysis, that noise inappropriately contributes to estimates of
memory for the studied materials.
Sampling Models of Choice Tasks
A third argument in favor of criterion variance comes from
sequential sampling models that explicitly account for both
response time and accuracy in two-choice decisions. Specifi-
cally, the diffusion model of Ratcliff (1978, 1988; Ratcliff &
Rouder, 1998) serves as a benchmark in the field of recognition
memory (e.g., Ratcliff, Thapar, & McKoon, 2004) in that it
successfully accounts for aspects of data, including response
times, that other models do not explicitly address. It would thus
seem that general, heuristic models like TSD have much to gain
from analyzing the nature of the decision process in the diffu-
sion model.
That model provides a full account of recognition memory
only when two critical parameters are allowed to vary (Ratcliff
& Rouder, 1998). First is a parameter that corresponds to the
variability in the rate with which evidence accumulates from
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trial to trial. This value corresponds naturally to stimulus-based
variability and resembles the parameter governing variability in
the evidence distributions in TSD. The second parameter cor-
responds to trial-to-trial variability in the starting point for the
diffusion process. When this value moves closer to a decision
boundary, less evidence is required prior to a decision—thus,
this value is analogous to variability in criterion placement. A
recent extension of the diffusion model to the confidence-rating
procedure (Ratcliff & Starns, in press) has a similar mechanism.
The fact that the otherwise quite powerful diffusion model fails
to provide a comprehensive account of recognition memory
without possessing explicit variability in criterion suggests that
such variability influences performance in recognition nontrivi-
ally.
Evidence From Psychophysical Tasks
Thurstonian-type models with criterial variability have been
more widely considered in psychophysics and psychoacoustics,
where they have generally met with considerable success. Nosof-
sky (1983) found that range effects in auditory discrimination were
due to increasing representational and criterial variance with wider
ranges. Bonnel and Miller (1994) found evidence of considerable
criterial variance in a same–different line-length judgment task in
which attention to two stimuli was manipulated by instruction.
They concluded that criterial variability was greater than represen-
tational variability in their task (see Bonnel & Miller, 1994,
Experiment 2) and that focused attention served to decrease that
variance.
Comparisons of Forced-Choice and Yes–No Procedures
One of the outstanding early successes of TSD is the proof by
Green (1964; Green & Moses, 1966) that the area under the
isosensitivity function as estimated by the rating-scale procedure
should be equal to the proportion of correct responses in a two-
alternative forced-choice task. This result generalizes across any
plausible assumption about the shape of evidence distributions, as
long as they are continuous, and is thus not limited by the assump-
tion of normality typically imposed on TSD. Empirical verification
of this claim would strongly support the assumptions underlying
TSD, including that of a nonvariable criterion, but the extant work
on this topic is quite mixed.
In perceptual tasks, this relationship appears to be approxi-
mately correct under some conditions (Emmerich, 1968; Green &
Moses, 1966; Schulman & Mitchell, 1966; Shipley, 1965; Whit-
more, Williams, & Ermey, 1968) but is not as strong or as
consistent as one might expect (Lapsley Miller, Scurfield, Drga,
Galvin, & Whitmore, 2002). Even within a generalization of
Green’s principle to a wide range of other decision axes and
decision variables (Lapsley Miller et al., 2002), considerable ob-
server inconsistency was noted. Such inconsistency is the province
of our exploration here. In fact, a relaxation of the assumption of
nonvariable criteria permits conditions in which this relationship
can be violated. Wickelgren (1968) noted that it was “quite amaz-
ing” (p. 115) that the relationship appeared to hold even approx-
imately.
The empirical evidence regarding the correspondence be-
tween forced-choice and yes–no recognition also suggests an
inadequacy in the basic model. Green and Moses (1966) re-
ported one experiment that conformed well to the prediction
(Experiment 2) and one that violated it somewhat (Experiment
1). Most recent studies have made this comparison under the
equal-variance assumption reviewed earlier as inadequate for
recognition memory (Deffenbacher, Leu, & Brown, 1981;
Khoe, Kroll, Yonelinas, Dobbins, & Knight, 2000; Yonelinas,
Hockley, & Murdock, 1992), but experiments that have relaxed
this assumption have yielded mixed results: Some have con-
cluded that TSD-predicted correspondences are adequate
(Smith & Duncan, 2004), and others have concluded in favor of
other models (Kroll, Yonelinas, Dobbins, & Frederick, 2002).
However, Smith and Duncan (2004) used rating scales for both
forced-choice and yes–no recognition, making it impossible to
establish whether their correspondences were good because
ratings imposed no decision noise or because the criterion
variance imposed by ratings was more or less equivalent on the
two tasks. In addition, patients with amnesia, who might be
expected to have a great difficulty with the maintenance of
criteria, have been shown to perform relatively more poorly on
yes–no than forced-choice recognition (Freed, Corkin, &
Cohen, 1987; see also Aggleton & Shaw, 1996), although this
result has not been replicated (Khoe et al., 2000; Reed,
Hamann, Stefanacci, & Squire, 1997). The inconsistency in this
literature may reflect the fact that criterion noise accrues
throughout an experiment: Bayley, Wixted, Hopkins, and
Squire (2008) recently showed that, whereas patients with am-
nesia do not show any disproportionate impairment on yes–no
recognition on early testing trials, their performance on later
trials does indeed drop relative to control subjects.
Although we do not pursue the comparison of forced-choice and
yes–no responding further in our search for evidence of criterial
variability, it is noteworthy that the evidence in support of the
fundamental relationship between the two tasks reported by
Green (1964) has not been abundant and that the introduction of
criterial variability allows conditions under which that relation-
ship is violated.
Recognition Memory and the Detection Formulation With
Criterial Noise
This section outlines the mathematical formulation of the deci-
sion task and the basic postulates of TSD and extends that formu-
lation by explicitly modeling criterion placement as a random
variable with nonzero variability. To start, let us consider a sub-
ject’s perspective on the task. Recognition requires the subject to
discriminate between previously studied and unstudied stimuli.
The traditional formulation of recognition presumes that test stim-
uli yield mnemonic evidence for studied status and that prior study
affords discriminability between studied and unstudied stimuli by
increasing the average amount of evidence provided by studied
stimuli and likely increasing variance as well. However, inherent
variability within both unstudied and studied groups of stimuli
yields overlapping distributions of evidence. This theoretical for-
mulation is depicted in Figure 1A, in which normal probability
distributions represent the evidence values (e) that previously
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unstudied (S0) and previously studied (S1) stimuli yield at test.4 If
these distributions are nonzero over the full range of the evidence
variable, then there is no amount of evidence that is unequivocally
indicative of a particular underlying distribution (studied or un-
studied). Equivalently, the likelihood ratio at criterion is  
  . The response is made by imposing a decision criterion (c),
such that
Say “Unstudied” if (e c) 0.
Say “Studied” if (e c) 0.
The indicated areas in Figure 1 corresponding to hit and false-
alarm rates (HR and FAR, respectively) illustrate how the vari-
ability of the representational distributions directly implies a par-
ticular level of performance.
Consider, as a hypothetical alternative case, a system without
variable stimulus encoding. In such a system, signal and noise are
represented by nonvariable (and consequently nonoverlapping)
distributions of evidence, and the task seems trivial. Yet there is,
in fact, some burden on the decision maker in this situation. First,
the criterion must be placed judiciously—were it to fall anywhere
4 Signal (studied status) and noise (unstudied status) distributions are
referred to by the subscripts 1 and 0, respectively, throughout. This
notation ensures more transparent generality to situations involving more
than two distributions and can be thought of either as a dummy variable or
as representing the number of presentations of the stimulus during the
study phase.
C
µ0 µ1
HR
FAR
Cµ0 µ1
HR
FAR
A
B
Figure 1. A: Traditional theory of signal detection representation of the recognition problem, including
variable evidence distributions and a scalar criterion. B: An alternative formulation with scalar evidence values
and a variable criterion. Both depictions lead to equivalent performance. C  decision criterion; FAR 
false-alarm rate; HR  hit rate.
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outside the two evidence points, performance would be at chance
levels. Thus, as reviewed previously, criterion placement must be
a dynamic and feedback-driven process that takes into account
aspects of the evidence distributions and the costs of different
types of errors. Here, we explicitly consider the possibility that
there is an inherent noisiness to criterion placement in addition to
such systematic effects.
Figure 1B illustrates this alternative scenario, in which the
decision criterion is a normal random variable with variance
greater than 0 and e is a binary variable. Variability in performance
in this scenario derives from variability in criterion placement
from trial to trial but yields—in the case of this example—the
same performance as in Figure 1A (shown by the areas corre-
sponding to HR and FAR). This model fails, of course, to conform
with our intuitions, and we show presently that it is untenable.
However, the demonstration that criterial variability can yield
outcomes identical with those of evidence variability is illustrative
of the predicament we find ourselves in, namely, how to empiri-
cally distinguish between these two components of variability. The
next section of this article outlines the problem explicitly.
Distribution of the Decision Variable and the
Isosensitivity Function
Let x and 	x indicate the mean and standard deviation of
distribution x, and let the subscripts e and c refer to evidence and
criterion, respectively. If both evidence and criterial variability are
assumed to be normally distributed (N) and independent of one
another, as generally assumed by Thurstone (1927) and descendant
models (Kornbrot, 1980; Peterson et al., 1954; Tanner & Swets,
1954), the decision variable is distributed as

e c  Ne c,	e2  	C2 . (1a)
Because the variances of the component distributions sum to
form the variability of the decision variable, it is not possible to
discriminate between evidence and criterial variability on a purely
theoretical basis (see also Wickelgren & Norman, 1966). This
constraint does not preclude an empirical resolution, however. In
addition, reworking the Thurstone model such that criteria cannot
violate order constraints yields a model in which theoretical dis-
crimination between criterion and evidence noise may be possible
(Rosner & Kochanski, 2008).
Performance in a recognition task can be related to the decision
variable by defining areas over the appropriate evidence function
and, as is typically done in TSD, assigning the unstudied (e0)
distribution a mean of 0 and unit variance:
FAR  p
respond S|e0  
c

N 0, 1  	C2 ,
HR  p
respond S|e1  
c

N1, 	12  	C2 , (1b)
in which respond S indicates a signal response, or a “yes” in a
typical recognition task. These values are easiest to work with in
normal-deviate coordinates:
zFAR 
c
1  	C2
,
zHR 
1  c
	12  	C2
. (1c)
Substitution and rearrangement yield the general model for the
isosensitivity function with both representational and criterial vari-
ability (for related derivations, see McNicol, 1972; Wickelgren,
1968):
zHR 
1
	12  	C2
 zFAR
1  	C2
	12  	C2
. (2)
Note that, by this formulation, the slope of the function is not
simply the reciprocal of the signal standard deviation, as it is in
unequal-variance TSD. Increasing evidence variance will indeed
decrease the slope of the function. However, the variances of the
evidence and the criterion distribution also have an interactive
effect: When the signal variance is greater than 1, increasing
criterion variance will increase the slope. When it is less than 1,
increasing criterion variance will decrease the slope. Equivalently,
criterial variance reduces the effect of stimulus variance and
pushes the slope toward 1.
Figure 2 depicts how isosensitivity functions vary as a function
of criterial variance and confirms the claim of previous theorists
(Treisman & Faulkner, 1984; Wickelgren, 1968) and implication
of Equation 2 that criterial variability generally decreases the area
under the isosensitivity function. The slight convexity at the mar-
gins of the function that results from unequal variances is an
exception to that generality (see also Thomas and Myers, 1972).
The left panels depict increasing criterial variance for signal vari-
ance less than 1, the right panels for signal variance greater than 1.
The middle panels show that, when signal variance is equal to
noise variance, criterial variance decreases the area under the curve
but the slope does not change. It is worth noting that the prominent
attenuating effect of criterial variance on the area under the func-
tion is generalizable across a number of plausible alternative
distributions (including the logistic and gamma distributions;
Thomas & Myers, 1972).
When criterial variability is zero, Equation 2 reduces to the
familiar form of the unequal-variance model of TSD:
zHR 
1
	1
 zFAR
1
	1
,
in which the slope of the function is the reciprocal of the signal
variance and the y-intercept is 1/	1. When the distributions are
assumed to have equal variance, as shown in Figure 1A, the slope
of this line is 1.
When stimulus variability is zero and criterion variability is
nonzero, as in Figure 1B, the isosensitivity function is
zHR 
1
	C
 zFAR,
and when stimulus variability is nonzero but equal for the two
distributions, the zROC is
zHR 
1
1  	C2
 zFAR.
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In both cases, the function has a slope of 1 and is thus identical
to the case in which representational variability is nonzero but does
not vary with stimulus type; thus, there is no principled way of
using the isosensitivity function to distinguish between the two
hypothetical cases shown in Figure 1, in which either evidence but
not criterial variability or criterial but not evidence variability is
present. Thankfully, given the actual form of the empirical isosen-
sitivity function—which typically reveals a nonunit slope—we can
use the experimental technique presented later in this article to
disentangle these two bases.
Measures of Accuracy With Criterion Variability
Because empirical isosensitivity functions exhibit nonunit slope,
we need to consider measures of accuracy that generalize to the
case when evidence distributions are not of equal variance. This
section provides the rationale and derivations for ND-TSD gener-
alizations of two commonly used measures, da and de.
There are three basic ways of characterizing accuracy (or, var-
iously, discriminability or sensitivity) in the detection task. First,
accuracy is related to the degree to which the evidence distribu-
tions overlap and is thus a function of the distance between them,
as well as their variances. Second, accuracy is a function of the
distance of the isosensitivity line from an arbitrary point on the line
that represents complete overlap of the distributions (and thus
chance levels of accuracy on the task). Finally, accuracy can be
thought of as the amount of area below an isosensitivity line—an
amount that increases to 1 when performance is perfect and drops
to 0.5 when performance is at chance. Each of these perspectives
has interpretive value: The distribution-overlap conceptualization
is easiest to relate to the types of figures associated with TSD (e.g.,
Figure 1A); distance-based measures emphasize the desirable psy-
chometric qualities of the statistic (e.g., that they are on a ratio
scale; Matzen & Benjamin, in press). Area-based measures bear a
direct and transparent relation with forced-choice tasks. All mea-
sures can be intuitively related to the geometry of the isosensitivity
space.
To derive measures of accuracy, we deal with the distances from
the isosensitivity line, as defined by Equation 2.5 Naturally, there
are an infinite number of distances from a point to a line, so it is
necessary to additionally restrict our definition. Here, we do so by
using the shortest possible distance from the origin to the line,
5 For an intuitive and thorough review of the geometry underlying
detection parameters, see Wickens (2002).
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Figure 2. Isosensitivity functions in probability coordinates (bottom row) and normal-deviate coordinates (top
row) for increasing levels of criterial noise (indicated by increasingly light contours). Left panels illustrate the
case when the variability of the signal (old-item) distribution is less than that of the noise distribution (which has
unit variance), middle panels when they are equal in variance, and right panels the (typical) case when the signal
distribution is more variable than the noise distribution. FAR  false-alarm rate; HR  hit rate.
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which yields a simple linear transformation of da (Schulman &
Mitchell, 1966). In Appendix A, we provide an analogous deriva-
tion for de, which is the distance from the origin to the point on the
isosensitivity line that intersects with a line perpendicular to the
isosensitivity line. These values also correspond to distances on
the evidence axis scaled by the variance of the underlying evidence
distributions: de corresponds to the distance between the distribu-
tions, scaled by the arithmetic average of the standard deviations,
and da corresponds to distance in terms of the root-mean-square
average of the standard deviations (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005).
For the remainder of this article, we use da, as it is quite commonly
used in the literature (e.g., Banks, 2000; Matzen & Benjamin, in
press), is easily related to area-based measures of accuracy, and
provides a relatively straightforward analytic form.
The generalized version of da can be derived by solving for the
point at which the isosensitivity function must intersect with a line
of slope (1/m):
zHR  zFAR 	12  	c21  	c2  .
The intersection point of Equation 2 and this equation is
 11	c2	12  2	c2  1, 1	1
2  	c
2
	1
2  2	c2  1
 ,
which yields a distance of
noisy da 
1	12  2	c2  1
	1
2  2	c2  1
from the origin. This value is scaled by 2 to determine the length
of the hypotenuse on a triangle with sides of length noisy da
(Simpson & Fitter, 1973):
noisy da
21	12  2	c2  1
	1
2  2	c2  1
. (3)
The area measure AZ also bears a simple relationship with da:
noisy AZ  noisy da.
Empirical Estimation of Sources of Variability
Because both criterial variability and evidence variability affect
the slope of the isosensitivity function, it is difficult to isolate the
contributions of each to performance. To do so, we must find
conditions over which we can make a plausible case for criterial
and evidential variance being independently and differentially
related to a particular experimental manipulation. We start by
taking a closer look at this question.
Units of Variability for Stimulus and Criterial Noise
Over what experimental factor is evidence presumed to vary?
Individual study items probably vary in preexperimental familiar-
ity and also in the effect of a study experience. In addition, the
waxing and waning of attention over the course of an experiment
increase the item-related variability (see also DeCarlo, 2002).
Do these same factors influence criterial variability? By the
arguments presented here, criterial variability related to item char-
acteristics is mostly systematic in nature (see, e.g., Benjamin,
2003) and is thus independent of the variability modeled by
Equation 1. We have specifically concentrated on nonsystematic
variability and have argued that it is likely a consequence of the
cognitive burden of criterion maintenance. Thus, the portion of
criterial variability with which we concern ourselves with is trial-
to-trial variability on the test. What is needed is a paradigm in
which item variability can be dissociated from trial variability.
Ensemble Recognition
In the experiment reported here, we used a variant of a clever
paradigm devised by Nosofsky (1983) to investigate range effects
in the absolute identification of auditory signals. In our experi-
ment, subjects made recognition judgments for ensembles of items
that varied in size. Thus, each test stimulus included a variable
number of words (one, two, or four), all of which were old or all
of which were new. The subjects’ task was to evaluate the ensem-
ble of items and provide an “old” or “new” judgment on the group.
The size manipulation is presumed to affect stimulus noise
(because each ensemble is composed of heterogeneous stimuli and
is thus subject to item-related variance) but not criterial noise
(because the items are evaluated within a single trial, as a group).
Naturally, this assumption might be incorrect: Subjects might, in
fact, evaluate each item in an ensemble independently and with
heterogeneous criteria. We examine the data closely for evidence
of a violation of the assumption of criterial invariance within
ensembles.
Information Integration
To use the data from ensemble recognition to separately eval-
uate criterial and stimulus variance, we must have a linking model
of information integration within an ensemble—that is, a model of
how information from multiple stimuli is evaluated jointly for the
recognition decision. We consider two general models. The inde-
pendent variability model proposes that the variance of the
strength, but not the criterial distribution, is affected by ensemble
size, as outlined in the previous section. Four submodels are
considered. The first two assume that evidence is averaged across
the stimuli within an ensemble and differ only in whether criterial
variability is permitted to be nonzero (ND-TSD) or not (TSD). The
latter two assume that evidence is summed across the stimuli
within an ensemble and, as before, differ in whether criterion
variability is allowed to be nonzero. These models will be com-
pared with the OR model, which proposes that subjects respond
positively to an ensemble if any member within that set yields
evidence greater than a criterion. This latter model embodies a
failure of the assumption that the stimuli are evaluated as a group,
and its success would imply that our technique for separating
criterial and stimulus noise is invalid. Thus, five models of infor-
mation integration are considered.
Criterion Placement
For each ensemble size, five criteria had to be estimated to
generate performance on a 6-point rating curve. For all models
except the two summation models, a version of the model was fit
in which criteria were free to vary across ensemble size (yielding
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15 free parameters and henceforth referred to as without restric-
tion), and another version was fit in which the criteria were
constrained (with restriction) to be the same across ensemble sizes
(yielding only five free parameters). Because the scale of the mean
evidence values varies with ensemble size for the summation
models, only one version was fit, in which there were 15 free
parameters (i.e., they were free to vary across ensemble size).
Model Flexibility
One important concern in comparing models, especially non-
nested models like the OR model, is that a model may benefit from
undue flexibility. That is, a model may account for a data pattern
more accurately not because it is a more accurate description of the
underlying generating mechanisms but rather because its mathe-
matical form affords it greater flexibility (Myung & Pitt, 2002). It
may thus appear superior to another model by virtue of accounting
for nonsystematic aspects of the data. There are several approaches
we have taken to reduce concerns that ND-TSD may benefit from
greater flexibility than its competitors.
First, we have adopted the traditional approach of using an index
of model fit that is appropriate for nonnested models and penalizes
models according to the number of their free parameters (the
Akaike information criterion [AIC]; Akaike, 1973). Second, we
use a correction on the generated statistic that is appropriate for the
sample sizes in use here (AICc; Burnham & Anderson, 2004).
Third, we additionally report the Akaike weight metric, which,
unlike the AIC or AICc, has a straightforward interpretation as the
probability that a given model is the best among a set of candidate
models. Fourth, in addition to reporting both AICc values and
Akaike weights, we also report the number of subjects best fit by
each model, ensuring that no model is either excessively penalized
for failing to account for only a small number of subjects (but
dramatically so) or bolstered by accounting for only a small subset
of subjects considerably more effectively than the other models.
Finally, we report in Appendix C the results of a large series of
Monte Carlo simulations evaluating the degree to which ND-TSD
has an advantage over TSD in terms of accounting for failures of
assumptions common to the two models. We consider cases in
which the evidence distributions are of a different form than
assumed by TSD and cases in which the decision rule is different
from what we propose. To summarize the results from that exer-
cise here, ND-TSD never accrues a higher AIC score or Akaike
weight than TSD unless the generating distribution is ND-TSD
itself. These results indicate that a superior fit of ND-TSD to
empirical data is unlikely to reflect undue model flexibility when
compared with TSD.
Experiment: Word Ensemble Recognition
In this experiment, we evaluated the effects of manipulating
study time on recognition of word ensembles of varying sizes. By
combining ND-TSD and TSD with a few simple models of infor-
mation integration, we were able to separately estimate the influ-
ence of criterial and evidence variability on recognition across
those two study conditions. This experiment pit the models out-
lined in the previous section against one another.
Method
Subjects. Nineteen undergraduate students from the Univer-
sity of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign participated to partially
fulfill course requirements for an introductory course in psychol-
ogy.
Design. Word set size (one, two, or four words in each set)
was manipulated within subjects. Each subject participated in a
single study phase and a single test phase. Subjects made their
recognition responses on a 6-point confidence-rating scale, and the
raw frequencies of each response type were fit to the models to
evaluate performance.
Materials. All words were obtained from the English Lexicon
Project (Balota et al., 2002). We drew 909 words with a mean
word length of 5.6 (range: 4–8 letters) and mean log HAL fre-
quency of 10.96 (range: 5.5–14.5). A random subset of 420 words
was selected for the test list, which consisted of 60 single-item
sets, 60 double-item sets, and 60 four-item sets. A random half of
the items from each ensemble size set was assigned to the study
list. All study items were presented singly, while test items were
presented in sets of one, two, or four items. Words presented in a
single ensemble were either all previously studied or all unstudied.
This resulted in 210 study item presentations and 180 test item
presentations (90 old and 90 new). Again, every test presentation
included all old or all new items; there were no trials on which old
and new items were mixed in an ensemble.
Procedure. Subjects were tested individually in a small, well-
lit room. Stimuli were presented, and subject responses were
recorded, on PC-style computers programmed using the Psycho-
physical Toolbox for MATLAB (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997).
Prior to the study phase, subjects read instructions on the computer
screen informing them that they were to be presented with a long
series of words that they were to try and remember as well as they
could. They began the study phase by pressing the space bar.
During the study phase, words were presented for 1.5 s. There was
a 333-ms interstimulus interval (ISI) between presentations. At the
conclusion of the study phase, subjects were given instructions for
the test phase. Subjects were informed that test items would be
presented in sets of one, two, or four words and that they were to
determine if the word or words that they were presented had been
previously studied or not. They began the test phase by pressing
the space bar. There was no time limit on the test.
Results
Table 1 shows the frequencies by test condition summed across
subjects. Discriminability (da) was estimated separately for each
ensemble size and study time condition by maximum-likelihood
estimation (Ogilvie & Creelman, 1968), and subject means are
displayed in Table 1. All model fitting reported below was done on
the data from individual subjects because of well-known problems
with fitting group data (see, e.g., Estes & Maddox, 2005) and
particular problems with recognition data (Heathcote, 2003) None
of the subjects or individual trials were omitted from analysis.
Details of the fitting procedure are outlined in Appendix D.
The subject-level response frequencies were used to evaluate the
models introduced earlier. Of particular interest is the independent
variability model that we use to derive separate estimates of
criterial and evidence variability. That model’s performance is
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evaluated with respect to several other models. One is a submodel
(zero criterial variance model) that is equivalent to the independent
variability model but assumes no criterial variance. For both the
model with criterion variability (ND-TSD) and without (TSD), two
different decision rules (averaging vs. summation) were tested.
Another model (the OR model) assumes that each stimulus within
an ensemble is evaluated independently and that the decision is
made on the basis of combining those independent decisions via an
OR rule. Comparison of the independent variability model with the
OR model was used to evaluate the claim that the stimulus is
evaluated as an ensemble, rather than as n individual items. Com-
parison of the independent variability model with the nested zero
criterial-variance model was used to test for the presence of
criterial variability.
Independent variability models. The averaging version of this
model is based on ND-TSD and the well-known relationship
between the sampling distribution of the mean and sample size, as
articulated by the central limit theorem. Other applications of a
similar rule in psychophysical tasks (e.g., Swets & Birdsall, 1967;
Swets, Shipley, McKey, & Green, 1959) have confirmed this
assumption of averaging stimuli or samples, but we evaluate it
carefully here because of the novelty of applying that assumption
to recognition memory.
If the probability distribution of stimulus strength has variability
	2, then that probability distribution for the ensemble of n stimuli
drawn from that distribution has variability 	2/n. This model
assumes that the distribution of strength values is affected by n but
that criterial variability is not. Thus, the isosensitivity function of
the criterion variance ensemble recognition model is
zHR 
1
	12n  	C2
 zFAR
1n 	C2
	12n  	C2
. (4)
Because we fit the frequencies directly rather than using the
derived estimates of distance (unlike previous work: Nosofsky,
1983), there was no need to fix any parameters (such as the
distance between the distributions) a priori. The hypothesized
effect of the ensemble size manipulation is shown in Figure 3, in
which the variance of the stimulus distributions decreases with
increasing size. For clarity, the criterion distribution is not shown.
Table 1
Summed Rating Frequencies Over Ensemble Size and Old–New Test Items
Condition 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 	1 m da
Size  1
New 105 109 124 105 67 60 0.75 1.28 0.78 0.64
Old 62 65 64 108 103 168
Size  2
New 107 139 115 99 70 40 1.25 1.52 0.66 0.88
Old 47 67 81 80 82 213
Size  4
New 134 146 108 76 57 49 1.50 1.60 0.62 1.10
Old 53 54 61 56 104 242
Note. Standard unequal-variance estimates of model parameters are shown on the right. 1  mean of the
signal distribution; 	1  standard deviation of the signal distribution; m  slope of the isosensitivity function;
da  a standard estimate of memory sensitivity.
n = 1
n = 4
n = 2
Figure 3. Predictions of the variability models of information integration for the relationship between ensemble
size (n) and the shapes of the evidence distributions.
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The fit of this model was compared with a simpler model that
assumes no criterial variability:
zHR 
1
	12n
 zFAR
1
	1
. (5)
Another possibility is that evidence is summed, rather than
averaged, within an ensemble. In this case, the size of the ensemble
scales both the signal mean and the stimulus variances, and the
isosensitivity functions assumes the form
zHR 
n1
n	12  	C2
 zFAR
n 	C2
n	12  	C2
(6)
when criterion variance is nonzero and
zHR 
n1
	1
 zFAR
1
	1
(7)
when criterion variance is zero. Note that Equations 7 and 5 are
equivalent, demonstrating that the summation rule is equivalent to
the averaging rule when criterion variability is zero.
We must also consider the possibility that our assumption of
criterial invariance within an ensemble is wrong. If criterial vari-
ance is affected by ensemble size in the same purely statistical
manner as is stimulus variance, then both stimulus and criterion
variance terms are affected by n. Under these conditions, the
model is
zHR 
n1
	12  	C2
 zFAR
1  	C2n
	12  	C2n
. (8)
Two aspects of this model are important. First, it can be seen that
it is impossible to separately estimate the two sources of variability
because they can be combined into a single superparameter. Sec-
ond, as shown in Appendix B, this model reduces to the same form
as Equation 5 and thus can fit the data no better than the zero
criterial variability model. Consequently, if the zero criterial vari-
ability model is outperformed by the independent variability
model, then we have supported the assumption that criterial vari-
ability is invariant across an ensemble.
OR model. The OR model assumes that each stimulus within
an ensemble is evaluated independently and that subjects respond
positively to a set if any one of those stimuli surpasses a criterion
value (e.g., Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; Wickens, 2002). This is
an important baseline against which to evaluate the information
integration models because the interpretation of those models
hinges critically on the assumption that the ensemble manipulation
alters representational variability in predictable ways embodied by
Equations 4–8. The OR model embodies a failure of this assump-
tion: If subjects do not average or sum evidence across the stimuli
in an ensemble but rather evaluate each stimulus independently,
then this multidimensional extension of the standard TSD model
will provide a superior fit to the data.
The situation is simplified because the stimuli within an ensem-
ble (and, in fact, across the entire study set) can be thought of as
multiple instances of a common random variable. The advantage
of this situation is apparent in Figure 4, which depicts the two-
dimensional TSD representation of the OR model applied to two
stimuli. Here, the strength distributions are shown jointly as den-
sity contours; the projection of the marginal distributions onto
either axis represents the standard TSD case. Because the stimuli
are represented by a common random variable, those projections
are equivalent.
According to the standard TSD view, a subject provides a rating
of r to a stimulus if and only if the evidence value yielded by that
stimulus exceeds the criterion associated with that rating, Cr. Thus,
the probability of at least one of n independent and identically
distributed instances of that random variable exceeding that crite-
rion is
p
en Cr  1  p
e Crn
 1  1  p
e Crn. (9)
The unshaded portion of the figure corresponds to the bracketed
term in Equation 9. The region of endorsement for a subject is the
shaded area (above either criterion, and extends leftward and
downward to ).
Model fitting. Details of the model-fitting procedure are pro-
vided in Appendix D.
Model results. The performance of the models is shown in
Table 2, which indicates AICC, Akaike weights, and number of
individual subjects best fit by each model. It is clear that the
superior fit was provided by ND-TSD with the restriction of
equivalent criteria across ensemble conditions and with the aver-
aging rather than the summation process. That model provided the
best fit (lowest AICc score) for more than 80% of the individual
subjects and had (on average across subjects) a greater than 80%
chance of being the best model in the set tested. This result is
consistent with the presence of criterial noise and additionally with
the suggestion that subjects have a very difficult time adjusting
criteria across trials (e.g., Ratcliff & McKoon, 2000).
A depiction of the fit of the winning model is shown in the top
panel of Figure 5, in which it can be seen that ND-TSD provides
quite a different conceptualization of the recognition process than
Figure 4. The multidimensional formulation of the OR model for infor-
mation integration. Distributions are shown from above. Given a criterion
C and discriminability d for a single stimulus, the shaded area represents
predicted performance on the joint stimulus.
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does standard TSD (shown in the bottom panel). In addition to
criterial variance, the variance of the studied population of items is
estimated to be much greater relative to the unstudied population.
This suggests that the act of studying words may confer quite
substantial variability and that criterial variance acts to mask that
variability. The implications of this are considered in the next
major section.
Psychological Implications of Criterial Variance
When interpreted in the context of TSD, superior performance
in one condition versus another or as exhibited by one subject over
another is attributable either to a greater distance between the
means of the two probability distributions or to lesser variability of
the distributions. In ND-TSD, superior performance can addition-
ally reflect lower levels of criterial variability. In this section, we
outline several current and historical problems that may benefit
from an explicit consideration of criterial variability. The first two
issues we consider underlie current debates about the relationship
between the slope of the isosensitivity function and theoretical
models of recognition and of decision making. The third issue
revisits the standoff between deterministic and probabilistic re-
sponse models and demonstrates how decision noise can inform
that debate. The fourth, fifth, and sixth issues address the effects of
aging and the consequences of fatigue and consider the question of
how subjects make introspective remember–know judgments in
recognition tasks. These final points are all relevant to current
theoretical and empirical debates in recognition memory.
Effects of Recognition Criterion Variability on the
Isosensitivity Function
Understanding the psychological factors underlying the slope of
the isosensitivity function have proven to be somewhat of a puzzle
in psychology in general and in recognition memory in particular.
Different tasks appear to yield different results: For example,
recognition of odors yields functions with slopes 1 (Rabin &
Cain, 1984; Swets, 1986a), whereas recognition of words typically
yields considerably shallower slopes (Ratcliff et al., 1992, 1994).
That latter result is particularly important because it is inconsistent
with a number of prominent models of recognition memory (Eich,
1982; Murdock, 1982; Pike, 1984). The form of the isosensitivity
function has even been used to explore variants of recognition
memory, including memory for associative relations (Kelley &
Wixted, 2001; Rotello, Macmillan, & Van Tassel, 2000) and
memory for source (M. R. Healy et al., 2005; Hilford, Glanzer,
Kim, & DeCarlo, 2002).
One claim about the slope of the isosensitivity function in
recognition memory is the constancy-of-slopes generalization and
owes to the pioneering work of Ratcliff and his colleagues (1992,
1994), who found that slopes were not only consistently less than
unity but also relatively invariant with manipulations of learning.
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Figure 5. Depiction of the results from the winning noisy decision theory
of signal detection model (Panel A) and traditional theory of signal detec-
tion (Panel B). Dark lines are evidence distributions, and lighter lines
represent criteria.
Table 2
Corrected Akaike Information Criterion Values (AICc), Akaike
Weights, and Number of Subjects Best Fit by Each Model
Model and parameter
Without
restriction
With
restriction
ND-TSD averaging model
Mean AICc 154 116
Mean Akaike weight 0.00 0.82
Number of subjects 0 16
TSD averaging model
Mean AICc 146 128
Mean Akaike weight 0.00 0.13
Number of subjects 0 3
ND-TSD summation model
Mean AICc 152
Mean Akaike weight 0.00
Number of subjects 0
TSD summation model
Mean AICc 150
Mean Akaike weight 0.05
Number of subjects 1
OR model
Mean AICc 146 159
Mean Akaike weight 0.00 0.00
Number of subjects 0 0
Note. With restriction and without restriction columns refer to models in
which criteria were allowed to vary across ensemble size (without restric-
tion) or were not (with restriction). Parameters from the winning model are
depicted in boldface. ND-TSD  noisy decision theory of signal detection;
OR  model with “OR” decision rule; TSD  theory of signal detection.
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Later work showed, however, that this may not be the case (Glan-
zer et al., 1999; Heathcote, 2003; Hirshman & Hostetter, 2000). In
most cases, it appears as though variables that increase perfor-
mance decrease the slope of the isosensitivity function (for a
review, see Glanzer et al., 1999). This relation holds for manipu-
lations of normative word frequency (Glanzer & Adams, 1990;
Glanzer et al., 1999; Ratcliff et al., 1994), concreteness (Glanzer &
Adams, 1990), list length (Elam, 1991, as reported in Glanzer et
al., 1999; Gronlund & Elam, 1994; Ratcliff et al., 1994; Yonelinas,
1994), retention interval (Wais, Wixted, Hopkins, & Squire, 2006),
and study time (Glanzer et al., 1999; Hirshman & Hostetter, 2000;
Ratcliff et al., 1992, 1994).
These two findings—slopes of less than 1 and decreasing slopes
with increasing performance—go very much hand in hand from a
measurement perspective. Consider the limiting case, in which
learning has been so weak and memory thus so poor, that discrim-
ination between the old and new items on a recognition test is nil.
The isosensitivity function must have a slope of 1 in both proba-
bility and normal-deviate coordinates in that case because any
change in criterion changes the HR and FAR by the same amount.
As that limiting case is approached, it is thus not surprising that
slopes move toward 1. The larger question in play here is whether
the decrease in performance that elicits that effect owes specifi-
cally to shifting evidence distributions or whether criterial variance
might also play a role. We tackle this question below by carefully
examining the circumstances in which a manipulation of learning
affects the slope and the circumstances in which it does not.
The next problem we consider is why isosensitivity functions
estimated from the rating task differ from those estimated by other
means and whether such differences are substantive and revealing
of fundamental problems with TSD. In doing so, we consider what
role decision noise might play in promoting such differences and
also whether reports of the demise of TSD (Balakrishnan, 1998a)
may be premature.
Inconsistent effects of memory strength on slope. The first
puzzle we consider concerns the conflicting reports on the effects
of manipulations of learning on the slope of the isosensitivity
function. Some studies have revealed that the slope does not
change with manipulations of learning (Ratcliff et al., 1992, 1994),
whereas others have supported the idea that the slope decreases
with additional learning or memory strength. While some models
of recognition memory predict changes in slope (Gillund & Shif-
frin, 1984; Hintzman, 1986) with increasing memory strength,
others either predict unit slope (Murdock, 1982) or invariant slope
with memory strength. This puzzle is exacerbated by the lack of
entrenched theoretical mechanisms that offer a reason why the
effect should sometimes obtain and sometimes not.
To understand the way in which criterion noise might underlie
this inconsistency, it is important to note the conditions under
which changes in slope are robust and the conditions under which
they are not. Glanzer et al. (1999) reviewed these data, and their
results provide an important clue. Of the four variables for which
a reasonable number of data were available (5 independent
conditions), list length and word frequency manipulations clearly
demonstrated the effect of learning on slope: Shorter list lengths
and lower word frequency led to higher accuracy and also exhib-
ited a lower slope (in 94% of their comparisons). In contrast,
greater study time and more repetitions led to higher accuracy but
revealed the effect on slope less consistently (on only 68% of the
comparisons).
To explore this discrepancy, we consider the criterion-setting
strategies that subjects bring to bear in recognition and how
different manipulations of memory might interact with those strat-
egies. There are two details about the process of criterion setting
and adjustment that are informative. First, the control processes
that adjust criteria are informed by an ongoing assessment of the
properties of the testing regimen. This may include information
based on direct feedback (Dorfman & Biderman, 1971; Kac, 1962;
Thomas, 1973, 1975) or derived from a limited memory store of
recent experiences (Treisman, 1987; Treisman & Williams, 1984).
In either case, criterion placement is likely to be a somewhat noisy
endeavor until a steady state is reached, if it ever is. From the
perspective of these models, it is not surprising that support has
been found for the hypothesis that subjects set a criterion as a
function of the range of experienced values (Parducci, 1984), even
in recognition memory (Hirshman, 1995). These theories have at
their core the idea that recognizers hone in on optimal criterion
placement by assessing, explicitly or otherwise, the properties of
quantiles of the underlying distributions. Because this process is
subject to a considerable amount of irreducible noise—for exam-
ple, from the particular order in which early test stimuli are
received—decision variability is a natural consequence. To the
degree that criterion variability is a function of the range of
sampled evidence values (cf. Nosofsky, 1983), criterion noise will
be greater when that range is larger.
The second relevant aspect of the criterion-setting process is that
it takes advantage of the information conveyed by the individual
test stimuli. A stimulus may reveal something about the degree of
learning a prior exposure would have afforded it, and subjects
appear to use this information in generating an appropriate crite-
rion (J. Brown et al., 1977). Such a mechanism has been proposed
as a basis for the mirror effect (Benjamin, 2003; Benjamin, Bjork,
& Hirshman, 1998; Hirshman, 1995) and, according to such an
interpretation, reveals the ability of subjects to adjust criteria on an
item-by-item basis in response to idiosyncratic stimulus character-
istics. It is noteworthy that within-list mirror effects are common-
place for stimulus variables, such as word frequency, meaningful-
ness, and word concreteness (Glanzer & Adams, 1985; 1990), but
typically absent for experimental manipulations of memory
strength, such as repetition (Higham et al., in press; Stretch &
Wixted, 1998) or study time (Verde & Rotello, 2007). This dif-
ference has been taken to imply that recognizers are not generally
willing or able to adjust criteria within a test list on the basis of an
item’s perceived strength class.
In fact, the few examples of within-list mirror effects arising in
response to a manipulation of strength are all ones in which the
manipulation provided for a relatively straightforward assignment
to strength class, including variable study–test delay (Singer, Gag-
non, & Richards, 2002; Singer & Wixted, 2006) and the use of
stimuli that were associatively categorized (Benjamin, 2001;
Starns, Hicks, & Marsh, 2006). Similar within-list manipulations
of strength tied to color (Stretch & Wixted, 1998) or list half at test
(Verde & Rotello, 2007) were unsuccessful, supporting the view
that the relationship between the strength manipulation and the
stimulus must be extremely transparent to support explicit differ-
entiation by the subject.
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What does this imply for the placement and maintenance of
criteria across conditions that vary in discriminability? When the
burden of assigning a test stimulus to a subclass falls on the
recognizer, he or she will often forgo that decision. In that case,
the recognizer will accumulate information on a single class of old
items as he or she samples from the test stimuli. However, when
the task relieves the subject of this burden, either by dividing up
the discriminability classes between subjects or between test lists
or by using stimuli that carry with them inherent evidence as to
their appropriate class and likely discriminability, then the subject
may treat as separate the estimation of range for the different
classes.
The effects of these strategic differences can be seen in
Figures 6 and 7. As shown in Figure 6, if increases in discrim-
inability lead to increased stimulus variance and criterion noise
is constant, the slope of the isosensitivity function should
always decrease when conditions afford superior memory dis-
crimination. This is shown in Boxes B and C. However, as
criterion variance increases, the effect of stimulus variance
becomes less pronounced (as can be seen by comparing the two
boxes). Consider the effect of a manipulation of memory on the
slope:
effect 
1  	C2
	12  	C2

1  	C2
	22  	C2
,
in which the subscripts 1 and 2 denote the two levels of the
manipulated variable, with level 2 being the condition with supe-
rior performance and greater stimulus variability. Under these
conditions, it is easy to see that the value of this effect must be
either 0 or positive. That is, if stimulus variance increases with
discriminability, then the condition with greater discriminability
must have a lower slope. The inconsistency in the literature must
then come from the effect of those variables on criterion variabil-
ity, which can attenuate the magnitude of the difference. When test
stimuli are not successfully subclassified, then criterion variance
reflects the full range of the old stimuli rather than the ranges of
the individual classes.
Figure 7 illustrates the decision milieu that yields these differ-
ential effects. When the set of old items is heterogeneous with
respect to discriminability but subjects do not discriminate be-
tween the strength classes, then the sampled range of criterion
values reflects the full range of this mixture distribution, and the
variability of the criterion will be great (shown in Figure 7B as the
root-mean-square average of the criterion distributions in Figure
7A). When subjects do discriminate between the strength classes
and sampled values from each class inform a unique criterion
distribution (as shown in Figure 7A), then those two distributions
will both be of lesser variability.
In both cases, criterion variance is constant across stimulus
classes, and the net effect is a decrease in slope. This occurs
because increasing stimulus variability is offset by a constant
amount of criterion variance. However, criterion variance serves to
effectively augment or retard the magnitude of the decrease. In
Figure 7A, in which each item class specifies a unique criterion
distribution, the lesser variability that accompanies the stimulus
classes translates into a lesser amount of criterial variability. In this
case, that lesser variability increases the degree to which stimulus
variability yields an effect on slope.
By this explanation, memory-enhancing conditions that afford
subclassification of the test stimuli with respect to discriminability
should be more likely to yield an effect on slope than variables that
are opaque with respect to discriminability. Now we are in a
position to reconsider the empirically studied variables enumerated
earlier. Variables that are manipulated between subjects or be-
tween lists require no subclassification within a test list and should
thus provide for relatively easy assignment at test. Of the four
variables mentioned earlier, only list length is always studied
between lists (by definition). In addition, variables for which the
discriminability class is inherent to the stimulus itself should also
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Figure 6. Slope of the isosensitivity curve as a function of stimulus (ranging from 1 to 2.5) and criterion
variance (ranging from 0 to 3).
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afford subclassification. Word frequency is the only member of
this category from that list.
The other two variables, repetition and study time, are the
paradigmatic examples of manipulations that do not routinely
afford such subclassification. An encounter with a single test word
reveals nothing about whether it was probably repeated or if it was
probably studied for a long duration—other than through the
evidence it yields for having been studied at all. Consistent with
the explanation laid out here, these are the very variables for which
the effects of discriminability on slope are less consistently
observed.
To summarize, manipulations that encourage easy allotment of
test items into discriminability classes are likely to promote lesser
criterion variability and are thus less likely to mask the underlying
decrease in the slope of the isosensitivity function generated by
increasing stimulus variability.
Slope invariance with manipulations of bias. Another recent
important result that is somewhat vexing from the standpoint of
TSD is the lack of invariance in the shape of the isosensitivity
function when estimated under different biasing or payoff condi-
tions (Balakrishnan, 1998a; Van Zandt, 2000). This failure has led
theorists to question some of the basic tenets of TSD, such as the
assumption that confidence ratings are scaled from the evidence
axis (Van Zandt, 2000) or, even more drastically, that stimulus
distributions are not invariant with manipulations of bias (Bal-
akrishnan, 1998b, 1999). Both suggestions do serious violence to
the application of TSD to psychological tasks and to rating tasks in
particular, but several theorists have defended the honor of the
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Figure 7. A demonstration of how a manipulation of learning can lead to a larger difference in slope between
conditions when subjects can successfully subclassify test stimuli (Panel A) than when they can not (Panel B).
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venerable theory (Rotello & Macmillan, 2008; Treisman, 2002).
Of particular interest here, a recent report by Mueller and Weide-
mann (2008) postulated criterial noise as a source of the failed
invariance. Mueller and Weidemann demonstrated that criterial
noise can account for the lack of invariance under a bias manip-
ulation using their decision noise model, which is similar in spirit
to (but quite different in application from) ND-TSD.
ND-TSD can also explain such effects quite simply. Figure 6
shows the joint effects of stimulus and criterial variability on the
slope of the isosensitivity function. A manipulation of bias is
presumed not to affect either the location or the shape of the
evidence distributions (cf. Balakrishnan, 1999) and should conse-
quently have no effect on slope. The predictions of TSD are
indicated by the darkest (bottom) line; any point on that line is a
potential slope value, and it should not change with a manipulation
of bias. However, if criterion variability changes with bias, then
the slope of the function can vary along a contour of constant
stimulus variance, such as shown by Box A. Such an interpretation
presumes that criterial variance itself varies with the bias manip-
ulation; why might this be?
First, criterion variance might increase with increasing distance
from an unbiased criterion. This could be true because placing
criteria in such locations is uncommon or unfamiliar or simply
because the location value is represented as a distance from the
intersection of the distributions. A magnitude representation of
distance would exhibit scalar variability and thus imply greater
criterion variance with more biased criterion locations. The model
of Mueller and Weidemann (2008) achieves this effect by impos-
ing greater variability on peripheral confidence criteria than on the
central yes–no criterion; such a mechanism is neither included in
nor precluded by ND-TSD. Similarly, criteria may exhibit scalar
variability with increasing distance from the mean of the noise
distribution. This assumption is supported somewhat by results
that indicate that criterion noise increases with stimulus range in
absolute identification tasks (Nosofsky, 1983).
In sum, if the variance of criteria scales with the magnitude of
those criteria, manipulations of bias may be incorrectly interpreted
as reflecting changes in the stimulus distributions. This does not
reflect a fundamental failing of TSD but rather reveals conditions
in which ND-TSD is necessary to explain the effects of decision
noise on estimated isosensitivity functions.
Deterministic Versus Probabilistic Response Criteria
In earlier flashpoints over decision rules in choice tasks, some
theorists suggested that the rule may be probabilistic rather than
deterministic in form (e.g., Luce, 1959; Nachmias & Kocher,
1970; Parks, 1966; Thomas & Legge, 1970). From the perspective
of TSD, the evidence value is compared with a criterion value, and
a decision is made based on their ordering. This strategy leads to
optimal performance, in terms of either payoff maximization or
maximal number of correct responses, when that criterion is based
on the likelihood ratio (Green & Swets, 1966). Regardless of how
the criterion is placed and whether it is optimal or not, this is a
deterministic response rule and differs from a probabilistic re-
sponse rule, by which the value of the likelihood ratio or a
transformation thereof is continuously related to the probability of
a particular response.
There was a tremendous amount of research devoted to the
resolution of this question in the 1960s and 1970s, in part because
TSD made such a forceful claim that the rule is deterministic. A
convincing answer was not apparent, however: The strong impli-
cations of static criteria were rejected by the data reviewed above,
including sequential dependencies and changes in the slope of the
isosensitivity function. Improvements in sensitivity over the course
of individual tasks (e.g., Gundy, 1961; Zwislocki, Marie, Feldman,
& Rubin, 1958) also suggested the possibility of increasingly
optimal or perhaps decreasingly variable criteria. In some tasks,
the prediction of a binary cutoff in response probability that
followed from deterministic theories was confirmed (Kubovy,
Rapaport, & Tversky, 1971), and in other tasks, that prediction was
disconfirmed (Lee & Janke, 1965; Lee & Zentall, 1966). In still
others, data fell in a range that was not naturally predicted by either
a binary cutoff or one of the probabilistic viewpoints reviewed
below (Lee & Janke, 1964). Cutoffs appeared to be steeper when
discriminability was greater (Lee & Zentall, 1966), suggesting that
subjects may employ cutoffs within a range of evidence and use
alternate strategies when the evidence less clearly favors one
choice or the other (Parducci & Sandusky, 1965; Sandusky, 1971;
Ward, 1973; Ward & Lockhead, 1971).
The evidence in favor of probabilistic models is mixed as well.
The most general prediction of probabilistic models of decision
making is that the probability of an endorsement varies with the
evidence in favor of the presence of the to-be-endorsed stimulus.
Whereas it is optimal to respond “old” to a recognition test
stimulus when the evidence in favor of that stimulus actually
having been studied outweighs the evidence that it was not (as-
suming equal priors and payoffs), probabilistic models suggest that
the weight of that evidence determines the probability of an “old”
response. Evidence from individual response functions in tasks
that minimized sources of variability revealed sharp cutoffs
(Kubovy et al., 1971). Simple probabilistic models failed to ac-
count for that result but accounted well for performance in other
tasks (Schoeffler, 1965), including recognition memory (Parks,
1966) and a wide variety of higher level categorization tasks (Erev,
1998).
A partial reconciliation of these views came in the form of
deterministic dynamic-criterion models (Biderman, Dorfman, &
Simpson, 1975; Dorfman, 1973; Dorfman & Biderman, 1971; Kac,
1962, 1969), in which the criterion varied systematically from trial
to trial on the basis of the stimulus, response, and outcome. These
models outperformed models with static criteria (Dorfman &
Biderman, 1971; Larkin, 1971) but did not account for a relatively
large amount of apparently nonsystematic variability (Dorfman,
Saslow, & Simpson, 1975). Similar models were proposed with
probabilistic responding (Larkin, 1971; Thomas, 1973) but were
never tested against dynamic-criterion models with deterministic
responding.
Probability matching and base-rate manipulations. Many of
the dynamic-criterion models made the prediction that responding
would exhibit probability matching (or micromatching; Lee,
1963); that is, the probability of a positive response would asymp-
totically equal the a priori probability of a to-be-endorsed stimulus
being presented (Creelman & Donaldson, 1968; Parks, 1966;
Thomas & Legge, 1970). Such theories also met with mixed
results: Although there were situations in which probability match-
ing appeared to hold (e.g., Lee, 1971; Parks, 1966), time-series
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analysis revealed overly conservative response frequencies (to be
reviewed in greater detail below) and poor fits to individual
subjects (Dusoir, 1974; M. F. Norman, 1971). Kubovy and Healy
(1977) even concluded that dynamic-criterion models that em-
ployed error correction were mostly doomed to fail because, em-
pirically, subjects appeared to shift criteria after both correct and
incorrect responses, an effect that was inconsistent with the
majority of models. They also claimed that models of the additive-
operator type—in which the direction of criterion change follow-
ing a correct response combination is predicted to be constant—
were wrong because subjects appeared to be willing to shift their
criterion in either direction, depending on the exact circumstances.
Here, we have explicitly avoided theorizing about the nature of
systematic changes in criterion so as to be able to more fully
examine the role of nonsystematic noise on the response function
and thus on recognition performance. Yet it can be shown that
criterial noise naturally and simply leads to conservative shifts of
criteria in response to manipulations of base rates of signal and
noise events.
Conservatism. An important result in tasks in which base rates
are manipulated is the excessively conservative response of criteria
to manipulations of the base rates of events.6 Overall, experiments
have revealed mixed effects of base-rate manipulations: Although,
in some tasks, subjects appear acutely sensitive to prior probabil-
ities (Kubovy & Healy, 1977; Swets, Tanner, & Birdsall, 1961),
even in recognition memory (A. F. Healy & Kubovy, 1978), those
shifts typically are lesser in magnitude than predicted either under
an optimal deterministic decision rule (Green & Swets, 1966) or
under the more conservative prediction of probability matching
(Thomas, 1975). Other data suggested that subjects in recognition
memory experiments did not modulate their criteria at all when the
base rates were shifted across blocks (A. F. Healy & Jones, 1975;
A. F. Healy & Kubovy, 1977).
The general conservatism of criterion placement has been at-
tributed to, variously, unwillingness to abandon sensory (or mne-
monic) evidence in favor of base rates (Green & Swets, 1966),
failure to appreciate the proper form of the evidence distributions
(Kubovy, 1977), inaccurate estimation of prior probabilities
(Galanter, 1974; Ulehla, 1966), or probability matching (although
this latter view was eventually rejected by the data discussed in the
previous section). In this next subsection, we show that either
probability matching or optimality perspectives can predict con-
servatism when criterial variability is explicitly accounted for.
Likewise, we show that criterial variability can mimic probabilistic
response selection.
Response functions, conservatism, and manipulations of base
rates. The most fundamental effect of the addition of criterial
noise is to change the shape of the response function—that is, the
function relating evidence to response. Here, we consider the form
of response functions in the presence of criterial variability and
evaluate the exact effect of that variability on the specific predic-
tions of optimality views (Green & Swets, 1966) and probability
matching (Parks, 1966). We show that (a) probabilistic response
functions are not to be distinguished from deterministic functions
with criterial variability and that (b) conservatism in criterion
shifts in response to manipulations of base rates is a natural
consequence of criterial variability (for more general arguments
about mimicry between deterministic and probabilistic response
functions, see Marley, 1992; Townsend & Landon, 1982). The
goal of these claims is to show how criterial variability can
increase the range of results that fall within the explanatory pur-
view of TSD and to demonstrate why previously evaluated bench-
marks for the rejection of deterministic models may be inappro-
priate. Specifically, ND-TSD naturally accounts for (apparently)
suboptimal response probabilities in response to manipulations of
base rate. It does so successfully because, as shown below, a
deterministic response rule in the presence of criterial noise can
perfectly mimic a probabilistic rule (for similar demonstrations,
see Ashby & Maddox, 1993; Marley, 1992; Townsend & Landon,
1982).
The deterministic response rule is to endorse a stimulus as “old”
if the subjective evidence value (E) surpasses a criterion value c:
p
 yes  p
E c.
Treating c as an instance of the previously defined random variable
for criterion, the response function conditional upon E is
p
 yes|E  E c	C  . (10)
Example response functions are shown in Figure 8A, in which
increasingly bright lines indicate increasingly variable criteria. The
function is, of course, simply the cumulative normal distribution of
which the step function that is the traditional implication of TSD
(shown in black) is the asymptotic form as 	c2 3 0. This result is
not surprising, but it is revealing, especially in comparison with
Figure 8B, which depicts response functions for two purely prob-
abilistic response rules. The first (darker) depicts Schoeffler’s
(1965) response rule, which is
p
 yes|E 
E 1	12 
1  
E  E 1	12 
,
and the second (lighter) line depicts an even simpler rule relating
the height of the signal distribution at E to the sum of the heights
of the two distributions at E, or
p
 yes|E 
E 1	12 

E  E 1	12 
,
in which  indicates the normal probability density function. In
each of these cases, the resultant response function is also a
cumulative normal distribution, thus showing that criterial vari-
ability can make a deterministic response rule perfectly mimic a
probabilistic one. To be fair, the rules chosen here are simple ones,
and simplifying assumptions have been made with respect to the
evidence distributions (with the latter rule, the evidence distribu-
tions have been set to be of equal variance). It is not our claim that
there are not probabilistic rules that may be differentiated from
deterministic rules with criterial noise, nor that there are no cir-
6 Note that conservative in this context refers to a suboptimal magnitude
of criterion shift with respect to changing base rates, not to a conservative
(as opposed to liberal) criterion placement.
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Figure 8. Response functions for deterministic response rules (Panel A) and probabilistic response rules (Panel
B). In Panel A, increasingly light lines indicate increasing criterial noise. Note that it is a step function when the
criterion is nonvariable. In Panel B, the two functions represent two different response rules (see text for details).
In all cases, the criterion is set at 0.
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cumstances under which even these rules can be differentiated
from one another. Rather, it is to demonstrate that a parameter
governing criterial variability can produce a range of response
functions, including ones that perfectly replicate the predictions of
probabilistic rules. This result provides a new perspective on the
phenomenon of conservatism seen in criterion setting, as we re-
view below.
Conservatism in response to base-rate manipulations. The
conservatism seen in responses to manipulations of base rate has
been hypothesized to reflect either suboptimal criterion placement
or a failure to accurately estimate the parameters of the decision
regime, including the probability distributions or the actual base
rates themselves. Here, we show that conservatism is a natural
consequence of criterial variability and arises with both optimal
criterion placement and probability matching strategies.
Optimal criteria for base-rate manipulations. Green and
Swets (1966) showed that the optimal bias can be defined purely
in terms of the stimulus base rates:
optimal 
p (noise)
p (signal).
When the evidence distributions are not of equal variance, an
optimal bias leads to two criteria. This fact is reflected in the
nonmonotonicity at the margins of the isosensitivity function or,
equivalently, by the nonmonotonic relationship between evidence
and the likelihood ratio throughout the scale. In any case, this issue
falls outside the purview of our current discussion and need not
concern us here. The effect of criterial variability can be amply
demonstrated under the equal-variance assumption.
In the equal-variance case, the optimal criterion placement is a
function of the optimal bias and the distance between the distri-
butions:
Coptimal 
log optimal 
1
2 d
2
d ,
in which d represents the distance between the evidence distribu-
tions scaled by their common standard deviation.
Imagine that subjects place their criterion optimally accord-
ing to this analysis but fail to account for the presence and
consequence of criterial noise. To evaluate that effect, we must
consider first how criterial variability affects d. To do so,
remember that d  zHR  zFAR. Substituting terms from
Equation 1b and setting 	12  	02  1,
dnoisy 
1  C
1  	C2

C
1  	C2

1
1  	C2
, (11)
where dnoisy indicates d under conditions of criterial variability.
This relationship indicates that d will be overestimated in com-
puting optimal criterion placement and that this overestimation will
worsen with increasing criterial noise. What effect does this have on
the overall rate of positive responding? That relationship is shown in
Figure 9A, which plots the deviation of overall “yes” rate from the
predicted rate of a semi-ideal decision maker—that is, one that is ideal
except insofar as it fails to appreciate its own criterial noise. These
values were computed by assessing the rate of positive responding
(for to-be-endorsed and to-be-rejected stimuli) at the semi-ideal cri-
terion for varying base rates (for d  1) and then comparing that
value with the rate of responding with added criterial noise. As noted
by Thomas and Legge (1970), the effect of criterial variability is to
lead to the appearance of nonoptimal criterion placement. The em-
ployed criterion is optimal from the perspective of the information
available in the task but nonoptimal in that it fails to account for its
own variability. The net effect is that low signal probabilities lead to
a nonoptimally high rate of responding and high signal probabilities
lead to a nonoptimally low rate of responding. This result is the
hallmark of conservatism.
Probability matching and criterial noise. According to the
probability matching view, subjects aim to respond positively at
the same rate as the positive signal is presented. Probability match-
ing often predicts more conservative response behavior than does
the optimality view presented above (Thomas & Legge, 1970). Let
P1 be the proportion of signal trials and thus also the desired rate
of positive responding (R1). Then,
R1  P1
HR  
1  P1
FAR
 P11  C	12  	C2  
1  P1  C1  	C2 . (12)
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Figure 9. A demonstration of conservatism as a function of base-rate
manipulations. Panel A shows deviation from optimal responding; Panel B
shows deviation from probability matching.
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Thomas and Legge (1970) pointed out that this function is
not an isosensitivity function but rather an isocriterion function:
It describes the relationship between HR and FAR and that
relationship’s invariance with R1 as sensitivity varies. Thus,
like the case above, we must assume a particular level of
sensitivity to derive values for the HR and FAR. In addition, the
relationship between R1 and C is complex because of the
integral over the normal distribution. In the simulation that
follows, we selected the value for C that minimized the
deviation of the right-hand portion of Equation 12 from P1,
assuming values of 1 for 1 and 	1. Deviation from this model
was estimated by simulating 1,000,000 trials for each signal
base rate from 0.1 to 0.9 (by steps of 0.1) and adding a variable
amount of criterial noise on each trial. The results, shown in
Figure 9B, indicate an effect similar to what was seen in the
previous case: Increasing criterial noise leads to increased con-
servatism.
Criterion noise within a deterministic decision framework
(TSD) can thus account for results that have been proposed to
reveal probabilistic responding. These demonstrations in and of
themselves do not reveal the superiority of deterministic theo-
ries, but they do suggest that such data are not decisive for
either viewpoint and, in doing so, call attention to the large
additional body of evidence in support of deterministic decision
theories.
The Effects of Aging on Recognition
Many of the current battles over the nature of the information
that subserves recognition decisions are waged using data that
compare age groups. For example, it has been proposed that older
subjects specifically lack recollective ability (Jacoby, 1991; Man-
dler, 1980) but enjoy normal levels of familiarity. Evidence for this
two-component theory of recognition comes from age-related dis-
sociations in performance as well as differences between younger
and older subjects in the shape of the isosensitivity function
(Howard et al., 2006; Yonelinas, 2002). However, the role of
criterial variability has never been considered.
Two general sources of differences between age groups in
criterial maintenance are possible. First, those mechanisms and
strategies that govern the evolution of criterion placement over
time may differ between young and older subjects, perhaps leading
to differences in variability of that placement over the course of the
experiment. Such a finding would be fascinating in that it would
provide an example of how higher level cognitive strategic differ-
ences play out in terms of performance on very basic tests of
memory (cf. Benjamin & Ross, 2008). Alternatively, it might be
the case that maintenance of criterion is simply a noisier process in
older people—perhaps attributable to one of very problems in
older people that it can be confused with, namely, memory (Kester,
Benjamin, Castel, & Craik, 2002)—and that recognition suffers as
a result.
Empirically, the results are as one might expect if older adults
exhibit greater criterion variability. The slope of the isosensitivity
function is greater for older than younger subjects on tasks of word
recognition (Kapucu, Rotello, Ready, & Seidl, 2008), picture rec-
ognition (Howard et al., 2006), and associative recognition (M. R.
Healy et al., 2005). The wide variety of materials across which this
age-related effect obtains is suggestive of a quite general effect of
aging on criterion maintenance, rather than a strategic difference
between the age groups. These studies have not attempted to
separate the effects of criterion and stimulus variability, and these
results are consistent with, but not uniquely supportive of, greater
decision noise in older adults. Future work is necessary to isolate
these effects within older subjects.
Changes in Sensitivity With Time
TSD is often used to evaluate whether fatigue affects perfor-
mance on a detection task over time (Galinsky, Rosa, Warm, &
Dember, 1993; cf. Dobbins, Tiedmann, & Skordahl, 1961) or,
conversely, whether improvements in sensitivity are evident with
increasing practice (Gundy, 1961; Trehub, Schneider, Thorpe, &
Judge, 1991; Zwislocki et al., 1958). Traditional interpretations of
such effects attribute fatigue-related decrements to increasing
stimulus noise and practice-related improvement to increasing
criterion optimization, but such dramatically differing interpreta-
tions of these related effects are not compelled by the data. They
reflect a tacit but intuitive belief that maintenance of criteria is not
demanding and thus not subject to fatigue. The purely perceptual
part of detection tasks is assumed to be similarly undemanding and
thus not likely to show much improvement with practice.
Consideration of criterial variability provides an alternate theo-
retical rationale that can unite these findings: Decrements arise
with time when fatigue increases the difficulty of criterial main-
tenance, and improvements arise when practice decreases the
effects of noise on criterion localization. Such a statement should
not be confused with an articulated psychological theory of such
effects, but it is an alternative theoretical mechanism that such
theories might profitably take advantage of when substantively
addressing these and related results.
The Slope of the Isosensitivity Function for Remember–
Know Tasks
There is currently a vigorous debate over judgments that sub-
jects provide about the phenomenological nature of their recogni-
tion judgments and whether those judgments validly represent
different sources of evidence (Gardiner & Gregg, 1997; Gardiner,
Richardson-Klavehn, & Ramponi, 1998) or two criteria applied to
a single continuous evidence dimension (Benjamin, 2005; Donald-
son, 1996; Dunn, 2004; Hirshman & Master, 1997; Wixted &
Stretch, 2004). The latter view is consistent with the received
version of unidimensional TSD with multiple criteria, as in the
ratings task discussed previously at length, whereas the former
view specifies additional sources of evidence beyond those cap-
tured in a single evidence dimension. Which view is correct is a
major theoretical debate for theorists of recognition memory, and
whether these phenomenological judgments of “remember” and
“know” status indicate multiple states or multiple criteria has
become a major front in that battle. That debate is peripheral to the
present work and is not reviewed here. We do consider how
criterial variability might influence interpretation of data relevant
to that debate, however.
Some authors have cited differences in the slope of the isosen-
sitivity function estimated from remember–know judgments from
the slope estimated from confidence ratings as evidence against the
unidimensional view of remember– know judgments (Rotello,
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Macmillan, & Reeder, 2004), whereas others have disputed this
claim (Wixted & Stretch, 2004). In a large meta-analysis, Rotello
et al. (2004) examined slopes for isosensitivity functions relating
remember responses to overall rates of positive responses and
found a greater slope for such isosensitivity functions. Wixted and
Stretch (2004) explained this result thusly: “The evidence suggests
that the location of the remember criterion exhibits item-to-item
variability with respect to the confidence criteria . . . if the remem-
ber criterion varies from item to item, the slope of the [isosensi-
tivity function] would increase accordingly” (p. 627).
Although not described in the same framework that we provide
here, the astute reader will recognize a claim of criterial variability
analogous to our earlier discussion. If the judgments in the
remember–know paradigm are subject to greater variability than
the judgments in a confidence-rating procedure, then the slope of
the isosensitivity function will be closer to 1 for the remember–
know function than for the confidence function. If the slope of the
confidence function is less than 1, as it typically is, then the
additional criterial variability associated with remember–know
judgments will increase the slope of the function. This is exactly
the result reported by Rotello et al. (2004).
This interpretation is further borne out by recent studies that
empirically assessed the variability in the location of the
remember–know criterion. Recent studies that compared models
of remember–know judgments with and without an allowance for
criterion variability for the criterion lying between “know” and
“remember” judgments revealed superior performance by the
models with nonzero criterion variability (Dougal & Rotello, 2007;
Kapucu et al., 2008). The heady controversy underlying the use of
the remember–know procedure may thus reflect the consequences
of unconsidered noise in the decision process.
Detection Theory and Criterial Noise
This article has questioned a very basic assumption of the
TSD—that the criterion value is a stable, stationary value. We
have forwarded theoretical arguments based on the psychological
burden of maintaining criteria and reviewed empirical evidence
that suggests the presence of criterial noise, including comparisons
of different procedures for estimating isosensitivity functions and
systematic effects of experimental manipulations on criteria, and a
long-standing debate over whether the response rule is probabilis-
tic or deterministic. Criterial noise makes these two candidates
indistinguishable and naturally accounts for the conservatism in
response shifts that is ubiquitous in experiments that manipulate
signal base rates. In addition, we have argued that the isosensitivity
function can be used to test theories of recognition only if criterial
variability is presumed to be negligible.
In the second half of the article, we have used the task of
ensemble recognition to tease apart the effects of criterial and
stimulus noise and shown that criterial noise can be quite substan-
tial. Given the empirical variability in estimates of slopes of
isosensitivity functions across conditions (Swets, 1986a) and the
lack of a strong theory that naturally accounts for such inconsis-
tency, it may be useful to consider criterion noise as a meaningful
contributor to the shape of the isosensitivity function and to
detection, discrimination, and recognition more generally.
We have considered at some length the psychological implica-
tions of this claim. The effects of learning on detection, discrim-
ination, and recognition tasks have always been interpreted in
terms of shifting evidence distributions. Primarily, distributions
are thought to overlap less under conditions of superior memory,
but hypotheses regarding the relationship of their shape to perfor-
mance have also recently been discussed (DeCarlo, 2002; Hilford
et al., 2002). The specifics of that shape have even been used to
test the assumptions of competing models of the nature of recog-
nition judgments (Heathcote, 2003; Yonelinas, 1999). Here, we
have argued that learning may also influence the variability of
criteria and that superior performance may in part reflect greater
criterion stability. This explanation does not deemphasize the role
of encoding and retention of stimuli as a basis for recognition
performance, but it allows for task-relevant expertise over the
course of the test to play an additional role.
Finally, we have reviewed a set of problems that the postulate of
criterion noise might help provide new solutions for, including the
inconsistency of manipulations of learning on the slope of the
isosensitivity function, discrepancies between procedures used to
estimate such functions, the effects of prior odds on shifts in
response policy, the nature of remember–know judgments in rec-
ognition, the effects of fatigue on judgment tasks of vigilance, and
the effects of aging on recognition. This is a small subset of areas
in which decision noise is relevant, but it illustrates the dilemma:
Accurate separation of the mnemonic aspects of recognition from
the decision components of recognition relies on valid assumptions
about the reliability, as well as the general nature, of the decision
process. We have provided evidence that variability in this process
is important, is apparent, and undermines attempts to use TSD as
a general means of evaluating models of recognition. ND-TSD
reconciles the powerful theoretical machinery of TSD with realis-
tic assumptions about the fallibility of the decision process.
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Appendix A
Derivation of de in the Noisy Decision Theory of Signal Detection
The value of de can be derived from the geometry of the isosensi-
tivity space, analogously to how da is derived in the body of the
article. We consider the point at which the isosensitivity function must
intersect with a line of inverse slope through the origin:
zHR  zFAR.
de is the point at which Equation 2 and this line meet, which is
 1	12	c2  1  	c2, 1	12  	c2  1  	c2 .
The distance from the origin to this point is
noisy de 
21
	12  	c2  1  	c2
.
This value is again scaled by √2 (see main text for details):
noisy de
21
	12  	c2  1  	c2
.
Appendix B
Demonstration That a Model in Which Criterion Variability Affects Ensemble Size Reduces to
the Zero Criterial Variance Model
The two models are represented in Equations 5 and 6 in the body
of the article. We start with Equation 6 and perform a little
algebraic manipulation and rearrangement:
zHR 
n1
	12  	C2
 zFAR
1  	C2n
	12  	C2n
.
zHR 
n1
	12  	C2
1
1  	C2
1
1  	C2

 zFAR
1  	C2
	12  	C2
1
1  	C2
1
1  	C2
 .
zHR 
n1
1  	C2
	12  	C2
1  	C2
 zFAR
1
	12  	C2
1  	C2
.
Let 	 
	12  	C2
1  	C2
.
Let  
1
1  	C2
.
zHR 

	2n
 zFAR
1
	
.
This is equivalent to Equation 5, thus showing that the two models
are equivalent in form.
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Appendix C
Monte Carlo Simulations and Assessment of Model Flexibility
In this appendix, we report the results of a series of simulations
of the ensemble recognition task intended to assess the degree to
which the noisy decision theory of signal detection (ND-TSD)
spuriously captures variability that reflects failures of basic as-
sumptions of theory of signal detection (TSD), rather than criterion
variability itself. Seven simulations are reported in which data
were generated assuming a failure of distribution shape assump-
tions (Simulations 1–4), a failure of decision rule assumptions
(Simulation 5), or no such failures (Simulations 6–7). With the
exception of Simulations 5 and 7 (as described in greater detail
below), criterion variability was 0. Each simulation employed 30
old (signal) stimuli and 30 new (noise) stimuli per ensemble size
(just as in the experiment) and 50 simulated subjects.
Failures of Distributional Assumptions
It has long been known that quite substantive departures from
the assumption of normal distributions still lead to roughly linear
isosensitivity functions in normal-deviate coordinates (Lockhart &
Murdock, 1970). Such a finding leads to concern that the param-
eters yielded by a model may not accurately capture the underlying
generating process and that TSD may appear to be a good expla-
nation of the underlying decision-making process when it is not.
Here, we ask whether failures of such distributional assumptions
benefit ND-TSD, with the implication that the validity of ND-TSD
would be undermined by providing a superior fit to data generated
under alternative assumptions.
The first two models considered the possibility that the gener-
ating distributions are exponential in form. In Simulation 1, only
the noise distribution was assumed to be exponential, and in
Simulation 2, both distributions were assumed to be exponential.
For both simulations, the rate parameter for the exponential noise
distribution () was set to 1. The signal distribution in Simulation
1 was normal, with mean 1 and unit variance, and the signal in
Simulation 2 was exponential with   2. Criteria were set to
reside at a constant proportion of the average of the distributions
means (.25, .50, .75, 1, and 1.25). Performance in conditions with
ensembles of two and four was generated using the averaging rule.
Simulations 3 and 4 used mixture distributions for the signal
distributions (DeCarlo, 2002). In both cases, the mixing parameter
was 0.5. The simulations differed in the placement of the distri-
butions; in Simulation 3, the signals were 2.5 d units apart from
one another (d1  0.5 and d2  3.0), and in Simulation 4, they
were 0.5 d units apart from one another (d1  0.25 and d2 
0.75). The criteria were again set to a constant proportion of the
average d values (.28, .48, .7, .91, and 1.21). Again, ensemble
performance was generated using the averaging rule.
Failures of Assumptions About the Ensemble
Decision Rule
Simulation 5 investigated a case in which an alternative ensemble
decision rule was used to generate the data. When criterion variance
is 0, the summation rule reduces to the averaging rule, as can be seen
by comparing Equations 5 and 7. Thus, for this simulation, 	C was set
to 0.8. The noise distribution was set to the standard normal distribu-
tion, and the signal distribution was set to be normal, with a mean of
1 and a standard deviation of 1.4. Criteria were set at0.28, 0.21, 0.7,
1.19, and 1.533 and multiplied by the relevant ensemble size for the
multiple-item conditions.
Standard Assumptions of TSD
In the final two simulations, the ability of TSD and ND-TSD to
accurately account for data generated under their own assumptions
was tested. In both, the noise distribution was the standard normal
distribution. In Simulation 6, the signal distribution was normal, with
a mean of 1 and standard deviation of 1.25, and there was no criterion
variability. In Simulation 7, the signal distribution standard deviation
was 1.4, and the criterion standard deviation was 0.8. Combining the
two sources of noise in this simulation yielded approximately
the same total amount of variance as in Simulation 6. In both
cases, the criteria were set to 1.2, 0.5, 0.5, 1.5, and 2.2.
Candidate Models and Model Fitting
Here, we consider the performance of a number of models in
fitting the data generated in the simulations described above. These
are roughly the same models used to fit the actual data generated
in the experiment in this article. There are eight models that
represent the full combination of three factors. Each model either
had a criterion variance parameter (ND-TSD) or did not (TSD).
With the exception of Simulation 5, each model had either a full
set of 15 criteria, five for each of the three ensemble conditions or
only five criteria (restricted set of criteria). Finally, each model
used either the averaging or the summation decision rule. Details
of the actual model fitting are presented in Appendix D.
Simulation Results
The results of the simulations are summarized in Table C1.
Across all four simulations in which distributional assumptions of
TSD were violated (Simulations 1–4), TSD was much more likely
than ND-TSD to achieve a superior fit. In addition, the models
using an averaging rule and a restricted set of criteria outperformed
their counterparts (as is appropriate, given the generating models).
The lesson of these simulations is that the extra parameter pro-
vided by ND-TSD does not benefit that model in accounting for
variability that derives from distributional failures of TSD.
In Simulation 5, we considered whether ND-TSD would benefit
from an incorrect specification of the decision rule. Because the
summation process leads to a major rescaling across ensemble
sizes, it did not make sense to have equivalent criteria across
ensembles. Instead, criteria were used that were a multiplicative
constant across ensemble size. Thus, two additional models were
fit (in the rightmost columns of Table C1 for Simulation 5) in
which there were only five free parameters for criteria (like the
restricted criteria models) but were multiplied by the ensemble size
(Appendixes continue)
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Table C1
Akaike Weights for the Simulations Described in Appendix C
Simulation
Full set of criteria Restricted set of criteria
Proportional
criteriaAveraging rule Summation rule Averaging rule Summation rule
ND-TSD TSD ND-TSD TSD ND-TSD TSD ND-TSD TSD ND-TSD TSD
1 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.80 0.00 0.00
2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.82 0.00 0.00
3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.67 0.02 0.04
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.67 0.04 0.08
5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.34
6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.78 0.00 0.00
7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.85 0.15 0.00 0.00
Note. Bold values indicate the winning model. These simulations reveal that ND-TSD does not benefit from excessive
flexibility. ND-TSD  noisy decision theory of signal detection; TSD  theory of signal detection.
(leading to 15 different criterion values). This was the generating
model, and as expected, it did outperform the other models (note
that the two proportional criteria models together achieved an
Akaike weight of 0.59). However, it is important to note that the
simulation did not effectively recover the relatively small amount
of criterion variance in the simulation (the ND-TSD version of the
proportional model was outperformed by the TSD version). This
result suggests that, to the degree that there is any biasing of model
performance, it is toward the models without criterion variance.
The final two simulations conformed to the assumptions of TSD
and ND-TSD, respectively (under the assumptions of averaging
and restricted criteria). As can be seen, the model fitting success-
fully recovered the original model, with quite high Akaike weight
scores.
Appendix D
Model-Fitting Procedures
All models were fit simultaneously to the response frequencies of
individual subjects for all three ensemble sizes. Parameters were
determined using maximum-likelihood estimation, as detailed below.
Criterion Variance Model and General Technique
The model predicts that the proportion of responses above the
jth criterion, cj, for old items in ensemble size n is
p
etotal  cj|old  
1  cj
	12n  	C2 (D1a)
and for new items is
p(etotal  cj|new)  
cj
1n 	C2 , (D1b)
where etotal is the total amount of evidence yielded by the ensem-
ble, 1 is the mean of the signal distribution, 	12 is the signal
variance, 	c2 is the criterial variance, and n is the ensemble size.
From this formula, we can derive the predicted proportion of each
rating, j, on the confidence scale for each item type:
1j p(etotal  cj|old)  p(etotal  cj1|old), (D2a)
0j p(etotal  cj|new)  p(etotal  cj1|new), (D2b)
where 1j is the proportion of the jth rating response for old items
and 0j is the proportion of the jth rating response for novel items,
for j  1, . . . , r, where r is the number of ratings and c0  
and cr  . The likelihood function for a set of parameters, 1,
	1
2
, 	c
2
, and cj for all j, given the data, xij for all i and j, is
L
1, 	12, 	C2 , all cj|all xij 

i0
1
Ni!

i0
1 
j0
r
xij!

i0
1 
j1
r
ij
xij
,
where i  0, 1 indicates the new and old ensembles, respectively;
Ni is the total number of the ith type of item; and xij is the frequency
of the jth response to the ith item type. The parameter values were
found that maximized the likelihood function for all three ensemble
sizes jointly. Specifically, the joint likelihood function is the product
of each of the three individual likelihood functions:
Ljoint 
all n
Ln,
where Ljoint is the joint likelihood function and Ln is the likelihood
of the parameters given the data from ensemble size n. Two
different sets of parameters were fit for the criterial variance
model. The first had a single set of criteria, cj where j  1, . . . , r,
that was constrained to be the same for all three ensemble sizes.
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The second set of parameters had 3r criteria, cjn for j  1, . . . , r
and n  [1, 2, 4], such that corresponding criteria in different
ensemble sizes were free to differ. The optimal parameters were
found using the mle function in MATLAB, which implements a
version of the Simplex algorithm.
Zero Criterial Variance Model
The zero criterial variance model was fit by constraining 	c2 to
be zero and maximizing the same likelihood function.
Summation Model
A version of the criterion variance model was fit in which it was
assumed that information was summed, rather than averaged across
an ensemble. In this model, Equations D1a and D1b are replaced with
p(etotal  cj|old)   n1  cjn	12  	C2 (D3a)
and
p(etotal  cj|new)   cjn 	C2 . (D3b)
All other equations remain the same.
OR Model
The OR model suggests participants perform a criterion compari-
son individually on each item in the ensemble and then endorse the
ensemble if any of the items surpass the criterion. The model implies
that the probability of endorsing an ensemble is the logical OR of the
probabilities of endorsing each word. Complementarily, the probabil-
ity of not endorsing an ensemble is the logical AND of not endorsing
the individual words. Assuming all the words in an ensemble have the
same mean and variance, on average, the logical AND of the misses
(or of the correct rejections) would be probability of a miss (or correct
rejection) raised to the ensemble size power. More formally, the
probability of endorsing an ensemble size at a given rating level is
equal to one minus the probability of none of the individual items
meeting or surpassing the criterion below that rating:
p(e1 or more of n cj|old)  1  cj 1	1 
n
, (D4a)
p(e1 or more of n cj|new)  1   cj	1
n
. (D4b)
Using these probabilities, the predicted proportion of each rating, ij, for
the OR model can be computed by plugging these probabilities into
Equations D1a and D1b. Likelihood Equations D2a and D2b can then be
used to find the maximum-likelihood estimators for this model. Like the
criterial variance and zero criterial variance models, the OR model was
also fit both using the same set of criteria across ensemble sizes and using
a unique set of criteria for each ensemble size.
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